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THE SPECIAL INTEREST RACE TO CEO PRIMACY
AND THE END OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAW
BY STEVEN A. RAMIREZ*
ABSTRACT

Recently, many respectedbusiness leadershave voiced concernthat
corporategovernance in American public companies has moved toward
CEO primacy or a "dictatorshipof the CEO," and away from traditional
notions of shareholderprimacy. This article shows that this concern is
well-founded. The current system of corporategovernance tends toward
managementindulgences. This is clearly reflected in key legal elements of
corporategovernance, which embrace increasing laxity. New empirical
evidence also suggeststhat the trend ofcorporategovernance is awayfrom
more demanding standardsthat seem to reduce agency costs and enhance
financialand economic performance. The model that best explains corporate governance dynamics are economic models of special interest
influence rather than any largely mythical race to ever more optimal
corporate governance standards. This article concludes that the suboptimality of corporategovernance is crisisproneand subject to challenge
from competing nations. Therefore as currently constructed the system is
unsustainable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance law in the United States is deeply flawed.
Legendary mutual fund founder John Bogle asserts that a "pathological
mutation" has transmogrified corporate governance from "traditional
owners' capitalism" to "new managers' capitalism."' Prominent business
commentator Robert J. Samuelson claims that Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) have "contrived" a "moral code that justifies grabbing as much as
they can." 2 In late 2006 and early 2007, a widening scandal over backdated
options grants had ensnared more than 200 companies in criminal and civil
probes (including two that resulted in criminal fraud charges) revolving
around whether "incentive" compensation plans were in fact rigged games

*Professorof Law and Director, Loyola Business and Corporate Governance Law Center,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Aimee E. Dreiss provided excellent research
assistance for this article.
'JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATrLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITAuSM 28 (2005).
2
Robert J. Samuelson, Delinquency of the CEOs, WASH. POST, July 13, 2006, at A23.
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designed to enrich officers at the expense of shareholders.3 Meanwhile,
CEO compensation at America's leading public corporations continues to
soar.' This article shows that "CEO primacy" is rooted in certain key legal
changes in the 1980s and 1990s that are in turn rooted in special interest
influence. 5 The cost of such CEO primacy to the economy and shareholders is huge.6 This article argues that this CEO primacy as embedded
in law is neither economically nor politically sustainable, and will create

3

The Wall Street Journal maintains an options backdating scorecard which lists the
names of companies ensnared and the nature of the probes. PerfectPayday: Options Scorecard,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/infooptionsscore06-full.html. As of this writing, the FBI has disclosed 52 inquiries and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) was pursuing 100. Stephen Taub, FBI Probing52 Companies
Over Backdating, CFO.cOM, Sept. 26, 2006, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
7962096/c_7961008?f=homejtodayinfinance; see also Liz Moyer, Who's Next in the
Crosshairs?,FORBES.COM, Aug. 10, 2006, available at http://www.forbes.con business/
2006/08/09/options-crosshairs-backdating-cx.lmO810options.html (pointing out that the government is cracking down on companies expected of backdating stock options to CEOs, with the
possibility that directors will be held responsible for any accounting irregularities).
4
In2004 and 2005, CEO compensation at large American corporations continued to reach
ever increasing heights. E.g., Gary Strauss & Barbara Hanson, CEO Pay Soars in 2005 as a
Select Group Break the $100 Million Mark, USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2006-04-09-ceo-compensationreportx.htm (stating that compensation for CEOs at America's largest 100 corporations soared
25% in both 2004 and 2005).
'E.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 344 n. 10 (2006)
(attributing CEO primacy to the death of the duty of care, the "reform" of the federal securities
laws to protect managers from private litigation and management's continued domination of the
proxy mechanism); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CiN. L. REV.
95, 114 (2004) (stating that lax state fiduciary duties contributed to a "dramatic increase in the
ratio of compensation of the corporate CEO to the average corporate blue collar" worker from 42
to I in 1980 to 475 to 1 in 2000). The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan
Greenspan (at the time, arguably the most powerful economist in the nation), has echoed those
voices that are concerned about the ascendancy of CEO power. Federal Reserve Board's
Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan) (stating
that lax boards had contributed to a CEO-centric corporate power structure that permitted senior
executives to "harvest" gains through manipulation of share prices), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govboarddocs/hh2002/july/testimony.htm.
6
See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating Executive Stock
Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=
931889 (finding that backdated options at forty-eight sampled companies resulted in approximately $600,000 in extra compensation for executives while costing shareholders at each
company $500 million in market capitalization). "Recent research has established that many
executives exert not only legal influence over their compensation, but also in many cases illegal
influence as well." Id. "[O]ur evidence suggests that managerial theft is not a zero sum game,
but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders." Id.
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constant pressure for reform until the current system of corporate
federalism is scuttled.7
Our system of corporate governance is dysfunctional because the
governing legal structure underlying that system is dysfunctional.'
Essentially, our system is based upon a historically path dependent
corporate federalism that yields three pernicious outcomes, each of which
are inherent in the structure of the system. First, a very small group of
citizens (those residing in the state of Delaware) has autonomy over
corporate law that affects the entire economy coast to coast; however,
Delaware has little interest in getting corporate governance right.9 Second,
federal intervention into this system is in response to broad-based political
pressure arising from financial crises; at such time, it is more expedient for
federal lawmakers to do something rather than the sound thing. 0 Third, in
a non-crisis political equilibrium, management interests are sufficiently
dense that they may concentrate their resources on corporate governance
issues while the public is oblivious; thus, in the ordinary course,

7

1n assessing the costs of backdating, the study found that the costs exceed the market
capitalization costs isolated in the study. Id. To the extent the public associates such behavior
with weak corporate governance, then the cost of capital is likely to rise nationwide, impairing
macroeconomic performance. See Mark J. Garmaise & Jun Liu, Corruption,Firm Governance,
and the Cost of Capital, (AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings Paper, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=644017 (on file with author) (finding that weak shareholder rights are
associated with a higher volatility risk (and therefore a higher cost of capital) in a transnational
empirical analysis, implicating the possibility of stunted macroeconomic performance).
'This article focuses upon corporate governance of the public corporation. Publicly held
companies are: (1) those companies or corporations traded on a national securities exchange such
as the New York Stock Exchange; and (2) those with 500 or more shareholders and $10 million
or more in assets. 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g) (2004) (stating statutory definition of public company);
17 C.F.R. § 12g- 1 (2006) (SEC exemption for companies with less than 500 shareholders and $10
million or less in assets). Public corporations are the central economic institution in the U.S., as
they command a total market capitalization of almost $16 trillion. See Wilshire Assoc., Fundamental Characteristics of the Wilshire 5000, available at http://www.wilshire.comIndexes/
Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006). As such they are the
primary store of investment capital in the U.S.
9
See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking CorporateFederalismin the Era of CorporateReform,
29 J. CoRP. L. 625, 629, 638 (2004) (documenting that Delaware is far more concerned with
quelling threats of federal intervention than getting corporate governance right); Edward B. Rock,
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1105
(1997) (discussing Delaware's politically vulnerable position as a small state with national
governing power).
'°See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE 3
(2006) (stating that the "best evidence" shows that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX or Act), which
was enacted pursuant to a "regulatory panic," has imposed net losses of $1.1 trillion).
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management has the greatest political sway over corporate governance.II
Each of these elements is exacerbated by deep information deficiencies
regarding corporate governance outcomes. 12 The result of this system is to
maximize the ability of management to reduce constraints, achieve ever
increasing levels of compensation, and impose agency costs upon shareholders and the economy as a whole; indeed, the system is devolving
towards CEO primacy and the end of shareholder primacy. 3 This article
posits that the resolution of these dynamics will require a deep restructuring
of the regulatory environment governing the American public corporation. 4
At least since William Cary's landmark 1974 article, Federalismand
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,5 there has been a running
debate regarding the proper role for the federal government in the area of
corporate governance. 6 On one side of this debate are those arguing that
state lawmakers seek to enhance their tax revenues from dispensing
corporate charters by providing otherwise suboptimal corporate governance
standards that are indulgent to managers, who currently make incorporation

"For example, Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the SEC during the 1990s, has catalogued
his efforts to quell CEO power over corporate governance issues, and the power of special
interests to frustrate his efforts. ARTHUR LEvITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 106-15 (2002) (recounting how "the business lobby" and "CEOs" successfully used Congress and the SEC to thwart an
effort by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to require that options be expensed on
corporate income statements).
' 2There is scanty evidence, at best, that corporate governance is impounded into individual
stock prices. Steven A. Ramirez, DepoliticizingFinancialRegulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv.
503, 572 (2000).
"Shareholder primacy has long been the rhetorical value upon which corporate
governance is constructed. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.").
14Financial regulation can be founded upon effective regulatory structures that are not
beholden to special interest influence. See Ramirez, supra note 12, at 504 (finding that "the
Federal Reserve Board's administration of monetary policy exemplifies the possibility of
depoliticiz[ing] regulation" in that it regulates effectively in the general public interest, and is not
beholden to special interest influence). In contrast to the system of regulation applicable to
corporate governance, the Federal Reserve's administration inspires far more accolades than
reform proposals. See id. at 553 ("The Fed thus demonstrates [that] important economic regulation can be secured against the pernicious influences of special interests. Benefits of expertise,
regulatory flexibility and stability of policy can [also] be secured.").
"William L. Cary, FederalismandCorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware,83 YALE
L.J. 663, 701 (1974) (advocating minimum federal standards for corporate governance for
publicly held companies).
6
1 As early as 1933, authorities recognized that state competition for charters could lead
to regulatory "laxity," as corporations sought charters in more permissive states and states
indulged corporations in search of franchise revenues. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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decisions. 7 On the other side are those claiming that capital markets would
punish corporations hobbled by suboptimal corporate governance, and
therefore neither states nor managers would pursue such standards; instead,
market competition assures that there is a race to the top, whereby states
compete to offer ever more optimal corporate governance. 8 This article
proffers a diagnosis that is more dependent upon the negative influence of
special interests rather than state versus federal law. Essentially, this
article argues that corporate governance law is polluted by familiar notions
of regulatory capture and public choice. In fact, this article will show empirically that corporate governance standards are suboptimal under both
federal and state law. 19
As such, this article urges to scholars to rethink the system by which
corporate governance is promulgated at both the federal and state level.2 °

17E.g.,

Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence FavorState Competition in Corporate

Law?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775, 1820-21 (2002) (finding that empirical record does not support the
conclusion that state competition for incorporations yields optimal corporate law outcomes);
Comment, Lawfor Sale: A Study of the Delaware CorporationLaw of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
861, 861-62 (1969) ("Delaware is in the business of selling its corporation law" and it therefore
"tries to give the [CEO] what he wants. In fact, those who will buy the product are not only
consulted about their preferences but are also allowed to design the product and run the factory.").
18

E.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-17 (1993)

(stating that empirical evidence shows that choice among jurisdictions for incorporation "benefits
rather than harms shareholders"); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, ShareholderProtection,and the
Theory of the Corporations,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977) ("So far as the capital market is

concerned, it is not in the interest of management to seek out a corporate legal system which fails
to protect investors, and the competition between states for charters is generally a competition as
to which legal system provides an optimal return to both interests.").
"gToday, it is possible to test the optimality of corporate governance standards through
the lens of an emerging science of corporate governance. Compare Harold Demsetz, The Firm
in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 426 (1997) (stating that under

"neoclassical theory" the firm is a "black box" in that its functioning is assumed to be optimal),

with M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of CorporateGovernancefrom Wall
St. to Main St.: Outside Directors,Board Diversity, EarningsManagement, and Managerial
Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REv. 1, 12-13 (2003) (overview of empirical evidence regarding

governance structures associated with superior financial performance). Given the recent vintage
of corporate governance science, and the fact that few legislators, regulators, and judges have
interdisciplinary facility, it is somewhat understandable that much of its learning has not
influenced corporate governance law. See Stacey Kole & Kenneth Lehn, Deregulation, the
Evolution of CorporateGovernanceStructure, andSurvival, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 421,421 (1997)

(stating that as of 1997 "much of the literature on corporate governance" took a "Darwinian view"
in that surviving firms are "presumed to have optimal governance structures" leading to an
"absence of evidence" regarding optimal governance structures).
20

See, e.g., Roberta. Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack

CorporateGovernance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005) (demonstrating that the SOX reforms
rest on a weak empirical basis in terms of the science of corporate governance). Corporate
scholars recognize that the federal securities laws are an essential element of the system of
corporate governance in the U.S., particularly with respect to the disclosure obligations of
management of publicly held companies. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities
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Getting regulatory incentives right is just as important as getting private
incentives right, and in the field of corporate governance, there is
compelling evidence that incentives are distorted.2' To the extent there are
manifest deficiencies in our integrated system of corporate governance
(arising from state incorporation laws and federal regulation of public
companies), there is a need for optimal regulatory structures that can
operate to move
our system toward an optimal system of corporate
22
governance.
Part U of this article will review the current learning on corporate
federalism in an integrated and unified manner. The entire system of
regulation of the duties and obligations of corporate managers will be
assessed to determine if special interest influence is subverting the system
of corporate governance applicable to publicly held companies. Naturally,
this analysis includes an assessment of the best and most current learning
on the race to the bottom/race to the top debate. However, this is a
beginning, and not an end. An assessment of the propriety of corporate
governance regulation at the federal level (where there is no argument of
any race) is also important as to whether special interest influence is
corrupting corporate governance. The focus will be on the substance of
corporate governance and the operation of prevailing regulatory structures,
and not on any truncated view limited to just state law dynamics or just
federal law dynamics.
Part I introduces and reviews the emerging science of corporate
governance, with a view towards assessing outcomes of the current
regulatory structure governing the means by which the duties and
obligations of managers are defined. Part 1H1 will demonstrate the
inferiority of the current regulatory regime in achieving optimal corporate
governance standards. The conclusion of both Parts II and mI will be fully
consistent: the United States is in peril of becoming a second world nation
in terms of corporate governance. The empirical evidence will show that
continuation of our current regime will hobble our most successful

Fraudas CorporateGovernance:Reflections upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 909-10
(2003) ("[W]e now have a functional division of monitoring between state and federal govern-

ments.").
2

E.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'
FiduciaryDuty through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393,451,456 (2005) (concluding that
current regime of essentially no liability for directors is "defective" and that "Enron suggests that
the costs of eliminating liability completely and thereby allowing corporate malfeasance to go
unchecked are simply unacceptable").
22
Andrew Parker, It Is Time for a Transfer of Power, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 4,
2005, at 10 (stating that "ferocious opposition" from corporate CEOs had stifled proxy reform,
leading to management power over the director selection process and higher compensation).
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enterprises with a higher cost of capital and will burden our economy with
stunted macroeconomic performance.
Part IV will place the evidence developed earlier in the article into
a theoretical framework of special interest influence that will demonstrate
its predominance over corporate governance. At least as early as the
drafting of the United States Constitution, influential voices have cautioned
that "factions" could operate in the context of a democratic republic to
undermine the "general welfare" and pursue their own legal agenda.
Today, there is broad support for the idea that small concentrated groups
may organize themselves. There is also little dispute that CEOs are a wellorganized group with access to significant resources. Theory would
therefore predict precisely the outcome plaguing our system of corporate
governance: a suboptimal economic outcome tilted strongly in favor of
CEOs.
This article concludes that corporate governance law as presently
constructed is not likely to survive. The current system yields inferior
substantive outcomes and there is no stable regulatory authority capable of
remedying this. The current system permits too much management
autonomy and fails to reduce agency costs to an acceptable level.
Consequently, shareholder primacy rhetoric is likely to give way to CEO
primacy reality and throw capital markets into serial crises. Ultimately,
superior models of regulating corporate governance will emerge (in the
U.S. or elsewhere) that will yield economically superior outcomes for
corporate governance standards.
II.

RACE TO THE TOP OR RACE TO THE BoTroM?

Historically, the issue of U.S. corporate governance has been left to
the states, and Delaware has appropriated the role of providing corporate
governance standards for about half of American publicly held
companies.2 3 However, in specific contexts, the federal government has
intervened in corporate governance when investor confidence has eroded
23

Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2491, 2494-95 (2005) (arguing
that although "Delaware writes most state corporate law" the federal government is poised to
intervene in a way that limits the autonomy of Delaware lawmakers and interest groups).
Corporations are permitted to incorporate in any state, and when they incorporate within a state
the internal affairs doctrine will operate to direct courts to the substantive law of that state for
virtually all corporate governance issues, other than those governed by federal law. MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 201 (9th ed. 2005).
Fifty percent of all publicly traded corporations have selected Delaware as their state of
incorporation and Delaware is now dependent on the franchise fees generated from dispensing
charters as it constitutes 20% of the state's tax revenue. Id. at 202. Management essentially
exercises autonomy over the state of incorporation. Id.
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to such a level that macroeconomic instability results or is threatened.2 4 A
recent example of this kind of intervention is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX or Act)2 5 which according to many respected voices imposed
compliance costs upon American business far in excess of any benefits in
terms of transparency and reduced agency costs. 26 Irrespective of such
episodic, even chaotic, interventions, the system of corporate governance
(often termed "corporate federalism") in the U.S. has both the look and feel
of regulatory dysfunction-specifically, it appears that management itself
dominates the regulatory apparatus that governs its duties and obligations
at both the state and federal level, except when a crisis emerges. 27 The
corporate corruption crisis that commenced with the failure of Enron in late
2001, and climaxed with the hurried passage of the SOX in mid-2002, did
nothing to shake this view of special interest domination accompanied by
transient exceptions.28 Indeed, events following the enactment of the SOX

24

Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of
Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBuRN L.J. 31 (2002).
The reason for federal financial regulation is macroeconomic not
microeconomic, failure .... The Fed was created in the wake of the panic of
1907 and the SEC was created in the wake of the Great Depression; both of
these events were notable for their macroeconomic consequences, not evidence
of some flaw in the efficient market hypothesis.
Id. at 40-41.
25
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
26
E.g., Romano, supra note 20, at 1594 (stating that the SOX corporate governance
reforms were costly and "poorlyconceived."). See also Enron'sLegacy, WALL ST. J., May 20-21,
2006, at A8 ("Congress, as usual, ran off in panic and whooped through Sarbanes-Oxley, the
intrusive accounting law that has cost the U.S. economy far more than predicted by its backers.
SOX has added billions of dollars in compliance costs, and for no clear public gain.").
"One such example of this special interest domination at the federal level is the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). E.g., Steven A. Ramirez, ArbitrationandReform
in PrivateSecurities Litigation:Dealing with the Meritoriousas well as the Frivolous, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1055, 1084 (1999) ("[R]ecent 'reforms' of private securities litigation are a
betrayal of several fundamental goals of the federal securities law and expose our financial system
to risks that are not fully appreciated.").
2An example of corporate influence operating to stymie reform occurred shortly after the
passage of the SOX, when the SEC attempted to reform the rules governing proxy voting for
shareholders in a public corporation. E.g., Amy Borrus, SEC Reforms: Big Biz Says Enough
Already, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 43 (detailing the efforts of corporate mangers to stifle proxy
reform); Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, A Legacy that May not Last, Bus. WEEK, June 13,
2005, at 38 (discussing business lobbying efforts to frustrate proxy reform). Consequently, the
entire SOX reform effort (including associated reforms in corporate governance at the New York
Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Marketplace) has left CEOs in virtual unfettered control of the
machinery of so-called corporate democracy. See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of
"CorporateDemocracy": Shareholder Voice and Management Composition 77 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 735 (2003) ("For all the current talk of corporate governance reform, corporate democracy
remains a myth.").
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served only to reinforce this view, as special interest influence operated in
the wake of the Act to blunt much of its sting.29 Thus, leading investor
advocates now believe that the American public corporation is a
"dictatorship" of the CEO.30
The race to the top/race to the bottom debate has evolved in the
backdrop of this federal regulatory dynamic. Few have tied the two
together as part of a singular special interest dynamic.3' Yet there is no
logical basis for segregating the activity at the state level of corporate
governance from the activity at the federal level. 32 Directors and officers
are more interested in the substance of law and regulations governing their
conduct, rather than the source of such standards.33 It is true that there is
a greater wealth of empirical analysis regarding the race to the bottom/race
to the top debate from the perspective of state law. 34 But if managers use
special interest influence in one arena to dilute their duties, it is only logical
that they would seek to do so in the other.35 Thus, an integrated view of the
evidence, and its manifestations in law, as well as capital markets and
economic and financial performance, seems to be a more efficacious
method of assessing the optimality of the current corporate governance
regime. 3' This integrated view of all the evidence inescapably leads to the
conclusion that whatever competitive force may exist to move corporate

29

Professor Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant, asserts that the Bush
Administration kept Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt on in order to continue to further the goals
of special interests and to minimize the impact of the SOX. Tim Reason, Two Weeks in January,
CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 2003, at 75 ("It's becoming more and more clear to investors that the
Administration kept Pitt in place to get done what the special interests wanted, which was to
minimize Sarbanes-Oxley as much as possible.").
3°BOGLE, supra note 1, at 29-30.
31
In 2000, I stated that viewing financial regulation from a "transcendent" perspective,
involving an analysis of both state and federal law, showed that as then structured our system of
corporate governance regulation "face[d] grave difficulties acting in the public interest." Ramirez,
supra note 12, at 584.
32
There is powerful evidence that the dilution of investor remedies under the federal
securities laws (pursuant to the PSLRA) was the product of special interest influence. See
Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1087 n. 156 (demonstrating that lobbying and campaign contributions
fueled the political effort to eviscerate private securities litigation).
33
Indeed, managers and their associated interest groups have used federal law to preempt
state law not to their liking, and have used their influence to change federal law not to their liking.
See id. at 1059 n.13.
34
Compare Robert Daines, Does DelawareLaw Improve Firm Value, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525,527 (2001) (finding evidence that Delaware corporations had higher firm value), with Guhan
Subramanian, The DisappearingDelaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004) (finding
that "Delaware's trajectory over the past 12 years is more consistent with the predictions of the
race to the bottom view").
35
36

See supra note 33.
See Romano, supra note 20, at 1529-43.
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governance in any direction, both the state and federal systems are subject
to dangerous special interest raids that compromise the regulatory infrastructure, which defines and channels corporate activity and has moved our
system of corporate governance towards a CEO primacy model.37
Some commentators have suggested that federal standards should be
expanded or that federal incorporation should displace the operation of
state corporate governance standards for publicly held companies, to
varying degrees. 38 Federal intervention has thus far been episodic and
sporadic rather than comprehensively preemptive. 39 The federal regulatory
framework itself, however, has recently been marked by special interest
"raids," particularly when the public gaze is diverted from issues of
financial regulation-which is to say almost always.4 ° The SEC, the
primary federal regulatory authority in the area of capital market regulation
for corporations issuing securities, has a spotty record, at best, of resisting
special interest influence. 4 ' Thus, vesting comprehensive power over
corporate governance for publicly held companies in the SEC (as currently
structured at least) is not likely to be successful.4 2 Merely calling for

37

E.g., BOGLE, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that a "pathological mutation" has gripped
corporate governance as "owners' capitalism" has become "managers' capitalism" and executive
compensation soared resulting in the transfer of trillions in wealth from shareholders to CEOs and
other insiders).
38
E.g., Jones, supra note 9, at 629 ("I do not advocate wholesale federal preemption or
the development of an optional federal regulatory scheme. Instead, I urge a sustained vigilance
from Congress and a willingness to take limited preemptive measures when state corporate law
rules fall short in ...protection for investors.").
39
See Ramirez, supra note 24, at 40-41.
'"Inappropriatepolitical and special interest influence pervade financial regulation. The
American economy has suffered greatly as a result." Ramirez, supra note 12, at 579.
4
'Former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has documented how special interest influence
subverted the ability of the SEC to protect the investing public and pursue reform in the 1990s.
LEvrrT, supra note 11, at 10 ("Once I began pursuing my agenda ...I saw a dynamic I hadn't
witnessed before: the ability of Wall Street and corporate America to combine their considerable
forces to stymie reform efforts."). Levitt asserts that these two "interest groups" thwarted the
interests of disorganized and under-funded investors across a range of issues, from expensing
stock options to auditor independence. Id. at 10-12, 136-37.
42
Id. at 10-12, 136-37. Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani have recently demonstrated that
federal intervention follows an historic pattern of imposing more rigourous constraints upon
managers. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, FederalCorporateLaw: Lessonsfrom History,
106 CoLUM. L. REv. 1793 (2006). While it is certainly true that federal intervention has
traditionally operated to mitigate shortcomings in state corporate governance, more recently
federal intervention has been marred by far more qualitatively important special interest
indulgences that will be shown to be closely associated with massive corporate scandals. Thus,
Bechuck and Hamdani fail to account for the role of special interest influence over federal
regulation in the 1990s, leading to the crisis of 2001-2002. See, e.g., supra note 41.
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federalization of corporate governance misses this point.43 Indeed, there is
good reason to believe that a federal special interest raid was a key
precipitating cause of the corporate scandals that erupted in 2001 and
2002.44
On some levels, the corporate corruption crisis of late 2001 and 2002
settled the debate regarding whether the system of corporate federalism in
the U.S. leads to excessive laxity in corporate governance standards, or
results in competitive pressure for states to formulate even more ideal
standards. 45 For example, to the extent the race to the bottom supports
more extensive federal intervention into the internal affairs of the publicly
held corporation, the spectacular corporate failures of 2001 and 2002 led
directly to the SOX-the most invasive federal regulation of corporate

43See Joel Seligman, The Casefor Minimum FederalCorporateLaw Standards,49 MD.
L. REv. 947, 949 (1990) (discussing laxity as a result of state law changes in shareholder
litigation, restrictions in shareholder suffrage, and decline of tender offers, but failing to explain
how federal law would lead to a superior outcome).
"See Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and Non Big 6
Auditors, AUDITING: J. PRACT. & THEORY, Mar. 1, 2003, at 93 ("We find that after the PSLRA
income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 but not for auditees of non Big
6 firms."). The authors use Big 6 firms to illustrate the impact of the PSLRA because their deep
pockets make them more susceptible to litigation, and thus more sensitive to the changes wrought
by the PSLRA. Id. Federal Chair Alan Greenspan asserts that the manipulation of the corporate
accounting system to enhance income in order to increase executive compensation keyed the
corporate corruption crisis. Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report, supra
note 5, at 44 ("Too many corporate executives sought ways to 'harvest' ... stock market gains.
As a result, the highly desirable spread of shareholding and options among business managers
perversely created incentives to artificially inflate reported earnings in order to keep stock prices
high and rising."); see also BOGLE, supra note 1, at 28 ("The change from traditional owners'
capitalism to the new managers' capitalism is at the heart of what went wrong in corporate
America [during the early 2000s]."). I argued in 1999 that the PSLRA "is a betrayal of the policy
foundations of the federal securities laws and a threat to the long term stability of our securities
markets." Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1093.
45See Jones, supra note 9, at 663 (stating that the spate of corporate corruption in 2001
and 2002 "reveals flaws in modem federalist arguments denouncing national-level regulation" and
that the "[u]nreflective allegiance to the internal affairs doctrine and the economic theories
invoked in its defense" should not stop future federal intervention into the corporate governance
arena). Others contend that fear of federal intervention has ended the race, as Delaware has acted
to preserve its monopoly over chartering corporations free from federal interference. See Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV.679
(2002). Delaware's monopoly position may stem from network externalities, meaning that
Delaware is chosen not based upon merit as reflected in the demand for corporate charters, but
Delaware's familiarity among other corporate constituents. Michael Klausner, Corporations,
CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 852 (1995) (concluding "the
possibility that network externalities are significant in the corporate charter market implies that
the products produced in that market may be suboptimal"). Delaware obtains 20% of its revenue
from franchise fees paid by corporations chartered there. EISENBERG, supra note 23, at 202.

HeinOnline -- 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 355 2007

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

[Vol. 32

governance in history.' The SOX excluded management from control over
the audit function by requiring an independent audit committee.4
Therefore, it created an entirely new regulator for auditors of public
companies.18 It also imposed new federal rules of professional responsibility for attorneys "appearing or practicing before the Commission" on
behalf of public companies.4 9 The Act also enhanced the need for independent directors.5 ° These are just the provisions of the Act that deal most
directly with corporate governance and the duties of agents involved in the
flow of financial information within the public corporation. 5' Federal intervention is therefore an increasing reality in corporate governance for
publicly traded companies;5 2 indeed, future meltdowns in investor
confidence are likely to lead to ever more intrusive federal regulation,
ultimately culminating in some system of federal incorporation.53
On another fundamental level, the corporate corruption crisis of 2001
and 2002 seems to have steam-rolled the idea that corporate federalism in
the U.S. has resulted in an optimal corporate governance regime.54
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review the empirical record to date with
respect to corporate federalism in order to assess the possibility that

'See Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in CorporateGovernance, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1159 (2004) (calling the SOX a "modest revolution"); Annual Review of Federal
Securities Regulation,58 Bus. LAW. 747, 748 (2003) [hereinafter Annual Review] (stating that
the U.S. Congress enacted the "sweeping" legislation "designed to alter the fundamental way in
which public companies are governed and operated").
4
TSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 204, 301, 15 U.S.C. § § 78j-l(k), (in) (2004) (requiring
an independent audit committee for public companies). An independent director may not receive
any compensation from the issuer other than board fees and may not be affiliated with the issuer.
Id. § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m).
48
1d. §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C. § 7211-7219 (creating the "Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board" to regulate audit firms of public companies).
49
1d. § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (directing SEC to promulgate rules governing the conduct
of attorneys "appearing and practicing" before the Commission).
' 0See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supranote 47. In addition to requiring each member
of the audit committee to be independent of management, the SEC's rules under section 307 of the
Act creates an optional qualified Legal Compliance Committee, which provides for a central role
for independent directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2006). A final source of increased pressure
for independent board members are rule changes at the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ that apply to companies listed on those markets, with the approval of the SEC. See
generally Seligman, supra note 46, at 1170-75.
51
See generally Annual Review, supra note 46.
52
See Seligman, supra note 46, at 1185 (calling for a "broad reexamination" of federal
corporate governance law to "augment" and evaluate current mandates).
53
See Romano, supra note 20, at 1523 (discussing compelling political pressure for
federal intervention in wake of stock market plunge of 2002 and a crisis of corporate corruption).
54
Ramirez, supra note 24, at 61-62 ("So long as executives of bankrupt firms haul in
millions while leaving their shareholders penniless, reality suggests that we have allowed blinding
adoration of market efficiency to lead us into the corporate governance gutter.").
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markets can still be used to continuously move corporate governance in a
more ideal direction.5 5 The major problem with any argument that markets
will move states toward more optimal corporate governance law is that no
study has been able to find any evidence that investors make decisions
based upon the state of incorporation.5 6 Thus, the evidence that Delaware
corporations are valued more highly by capital markets is inconclusive at
best.57 Instead, investors seem far more concerned about actual corporate
governance practices at firms (which can be implemented pursuant to any
state corporation code) than which state provides the substantive law
framework for corporate governance.5" There is simply no strong empirical
basis that state corporate governance law is impounded into stock market
price in a way that will create market pressure for more optimal corporate
governance standards.59 Markets seem unable to grapple with the impact
and content of corporate law, meaning that markets operate blindly with
respect to law and regulation in this area.
The most recent empirical analyses of the operation of corporate
federalism do not show that there is any race to the top spurred by
corporate federalism. One recent study found that firms that choose
Delaware charters are fundamentally different, and that any Delaware
effect-a putative increase in firm market value for Delaware firmsdisappears after controlling for factors such as accounting biases and
analyst forecasts.' In 2003, Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen
demonstrated that when firm decisions are disaggregated across jurisdictions (rather than viewed only from the perspective of Delaware versus
all other jurisdictions) a major factor driving incorporation decisions is the

5
See generally supra note 45; Ramirez, supra note 12, at 572 (concluding that "investors
neither care about nor have the ability to judge the state of incorporation and the impact that this

has on either their rights or profits," based upon a review of empirical studies).
56

Ramirez, supra note 12, at 572.
7Supra note 34 (comparing Daines and Subramanian).
5
For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, a provider of corporate governance
5

rating data for large shareholders, rates quality corporate governance based upon sixty-three
factors--only six of which are based upon which state provides substantive law for the internal
affairs of the corporation. ISS.com, Corporate Governance Quotient Domestic Rating Criteria,
available at http://www.issproxy.com/professional/analytics/uscgqcriteria.jsp (last visited
Feb. 21, 2006).
59
EISENBERG, supra note 23, at 204 (stating that it is "difficult if not impossible" to
demonstrate the optimality of Delaware's corporate law based upon stock market valuations").
6'Feng Chen et al., Are Delaware Firms Oranges? FundamentalAttributes and the

Delaware Effect (July 15, 2006), availableat http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/ papers.cfm?abstract
_id=912942.
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strength of a given state's antitakeover legislation. 6 ' Because antitakeover
legislation entrenches management and shields them from competitive
pressures of the market for corporate control,62 it is impossible to square
this finding with a race to the top. 63 Thus, any empirical foundation for any
supposed race to the top has essentially crumbled. 64
Any uncertainty remaining from the empirical record must be viewed
in light of lawmaking that is consistent only with the race to the bottom
thesis: increasingly relieving management of legal duties and responsibilities. The so-called duty of care illustrates the race to the bottom quite
well.65 In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court held a board liable for a

6

Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'DecisionsWhere to Incorporate,46 J.L.
& ECON. 383, 387 (2003) ("(Alntitakeover protections are correlated with success in the
incorporation market; adding antitakeover statutes significantly increases the ability of states to
retain their local firms and to attract out-of-state incorporations.").
62
The "overwhelming majority" of event studies show that antitakeover protections have
either no effect on shareholder value or harm shareholder value. In addition, there is empirical
evidence that such statutes operate to increase agency costs. Id. at 404-05 (citing, inter alia,
GRANT A. GARTMAN, STATE ANTI-TAKEOVER LAW (2000)).
63
See id. at 421 ("[I]n contrast to the beliefs of supporters of state competition, the
evidence does not indicate that the incorporation market has penalized even those.., states that
passed statutes universally regarded as detrimental to shareholders.").
64See generallyDaines, supranote 34. Even before the Subramanian study showing that
there was no durable "Delaware effect" resulting in superior market valuations for Delaware
firms, id., Professor Bebchuk contested the Daines study to the contrary. Bebchuk et al., supra
note 17, at 1820 ("This Article has shown that the body of empirical evidence on which supporters
of state competition rely does not warrant their claims of empirical support."). Bebchuk
questioned both the robustness of the association between Delaware incorporation and firm value
and asserted that proponents of state competition had confused correlation and causation because
of possible material differences between firms choosing Delaware charters and those choosing
non-Delaware charters. Id. Further, Bebchuk argued that the benefits of Delaware incorporation
could stem not from Delaware corporate law but from network effects or the benefits associated
with Delaware courts. Id. These points have been largely vindicated by subsequent empirical
analyses including those undertaken by Subramanian (showing very weak robustness) and Feng
Chen (showing that firms incorporating in Delaware are materially different from firms
incorporating elsewhere and that therefore comparing Delaware firms with non-Delaware firms
is like comparing apples and oranges). See Chen et al., supra note 60, at 22. Finally, Professor
Bebchuk was unable to find any Delaware effect at all in 1999. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note
61, at 403.
6
1See Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919, 927-28
(1988). The business judgment rule has long operated to protect business managers from
improvident business decisions. In Delaware, this meant that business mangers must be found
grossly negligent to breach their duty of care. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599,610 (Del.
Ch. 1974) (finding that the business judgment rule did not protect directors that had recklessly
accepted a "grossly inadequa[te]" price for the sale of the company). In practice, such a standard
means that the duty of care seldom triggers manager liability. I have argued in the past that this
approach may be optimal, at least when combined with appropriate private rights under the federal
securities laws. Ramirez, supra note 5, at 361 n.156.
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breach of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkom.6 The facts of Van
Gorkom could hardly be more compelling because the outside directors
assumed a joint defense with the CE0 67-and the CEO signed the
agreement to sell the public company without reading it and without
showing it to an attorney.68 Nevertheless, shortly after the decision to hold
the directors liable for gross negligence was issued, the Delaware
legislature enacted a statute that allowed directors to obliterate the duty of
care through a provision in the corporation's charter.69 By 1988, 40 states
had enacted director-insulating statutes. 7' The managers of the vast majority of public companies were subsequently able to use their control over the
proxy machinery 7' to eliminate their own duty of care. 72 Professor Marc
Steinberg thus stated: "The evisceration of the duty of care is a drastic step
in the corporate governance framework. Any further erosion makes a
'
mockery of... fiduciary duty. 73
The state of Nevada has now taken the
next mocking step: Nevada insulates all directors and officers from all
liability, unless it is proven they acted intentionally, fraudulently, or in
knowing violation of law.74 It is difficult to argue that the story of the duty

6488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
67
The Delaware Supreme Court specifically inquired of defense counsel (who represented
all of the director defendants) whether there was a basis for treating the outside directors
differently from officer directors, such as CEO Jerome Van Gorkom. Counsel for the defense said
there was no such basis. Id. at 899 (opinion on motion for reargument).
68

1d. at 867, 869.

69

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Section 102(b)(7) authorizes a provision
in the charter of a Delaware corporation that shields directors for monetary liability for breaches
of the duty of care. Although such a provision requires shareholder approval, "[m]eaningful
shareholder consent in this context is an illusion given management's control of the proxy
machinery process, the strong inclination of institutional investors to vote with management, and
the typical individual stockholder's ignorance of corporate charter provisions." Steinberg, supra
note 65, at 927.
70James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indeminfication,43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1209-21 (1988).
7"E.g., Joo, supra note 28, at 752-60 (demonstrating barriers to the effective use of
shareholder franchise rights against the wishes of management).
72Delaware alone accounts for fifty percent of all public corporations. See EISENBERG,
supra note 23.
73Steinberg, supra note 65, at 929.
74NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2003). This insulation may be eliminated by the articles
of incorporation. Id. Between 1980 and 2005, Smith stands as the only example of outside
directors being found liable and paying damages. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (2006) (studying actual out-of-pocket liability rather than
nominal liability). Thus, Nevada's insulation seems more symbolic than substantive. In Nevada,
as elsewhere, the duty of care for directors is dead letter law. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I
Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA.L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (stating that because a very high
percentage of public corporations take advantage of insulating statutes, the directors' duty of care
is "essentially obsolete"). Prior to 1980, duty of care liability for directors was hardly common,
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of care in American75corporate law is consistent with anything other than a
race to the bottom.
Nor is the death of the duty of care the sole outlet for the efforts of
management to limit their duties and obligations.76 Dean Seligman
highlights the restriction of shareholder suffrage rights, the decline of
tender offers as a source of discipline, and the decline in the ability of
shareholders to pursue litigation.77 Others focus upon the lax standards
governing compensation decisions as a problem.7 8 Each of the foregoing
reflects accelerating laxity in the duties of managers during the 1980s and
1990s, under state law. 79 This laxity is certainly consistent with the race to

a point lamented by respected corporate law voices, but Professor Bishop found numerous
reported cases of liability attaching even though he did not search for unreported settlements.
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1101, 1103 (1968) ("In sum, I think that the
practice of protecting corporate executives against litigation and liability has now been carried
about as far as it ought to be carried and perhaps a little farther.").
"One argument frequently trotted out in favor of laxity is that rigor will repel qualified
directors from serving. One problem with this position is there is little empirical support for it.
See S.F. Cahan & B.R. Wilkinson, Board Compositionand Regulatory Change:Evidence From
the Enactment of the New CompaniesLaw in New Zealand, 28 FIN. MGMT. 32 (1999) (finding
that more rigorous demands of New Companies Act in New Zealand did not lead to a reduction
in outside director representation). An additional problem with this approach is that it is radically
overboard-the same argument supports the abolition of all duties and obligations, a position no
commentator really supports.
76
The Delaware legislature was responding to concerns of the directors and officers
insurance industry when it passed section 102(b)(7), according to the synopsis of the bill. See
Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of CareStandardin Corporate
Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1,43 n.317 (1989). This is odd given that the market value of such
insurance companies rose significantly after the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision. Id. at 73-74. It
appears insurance companies were able to use the decision to enhance their premium revenues
with little real additional risk. Id.
77Seligman, supra note 43, at 949, 949-71 ("The most distinctive aspect of the last decade
in corporate law was the celerity with which traditional constraints on corporate managers
weakened.").
7$Linda J. Barris, The OvercompensationProblem:A Collective Approachto Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 100 (1992) ("With the massive compensation now being awarded,
courts have the perfect opportunity to find specific plans are unreasonable and unfair to
shareholders, instead of shielding excess compensation practices with the business judgment
rule."); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation andModest Proposalfor
(Further)Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 214, 220 (1996) (stating that while some law suggests
courts will enforce outer limits regarding compensation "in publicly-held corporations, in fact the
courts just do not reach the merits of a claim of excessive compensation" because of difficult
procedural hurdles). According to some commentators, Delaware courts have traditionally been
deferential to management. Jones, supra note 9, at 646-55. Indeed, Professor Jones suggested
that Delaware law provided "officers and directors a virtually impregnable shield from monetary
liability for corporate misdeeds." Id. at 646.
79
See generally supra notes 74 & 76 (demonstrating the laxity of state statutes regarding
the duty of care).
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the bottom thesis. However, a similar dynamic was transpiring
simultaneously at the federal level, where the focus has traditionally been
on disclosure duties to shareholders.
In late 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act8" (PSLRA). 81 The PSLRA imposed a new, more stringent
pleading standard on plaintiffs seeking relief under the federal securities
laws; imposed a new sanctions provision, approaching a loser pays rule on
such plaintiffs; created a safe harbor for forward-looking frauds; restricted
the ability of plaintiffs to seek class action relief under the federal securities
laws; imposed a stricter statutory causation standard for private securities
litigants; and restricted the availability ofjoint and several liability for such
claimants.82 In 1998, Congress followed up with the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which eliminated state class actions in
securities disputes involving public companies. 83 The dual effect of the
PSLRA and the SLUSA is to dilute the penalties and enforcement available
to deter securities fraud. 84 Thus, laxity is not limited to state law, nor is it
the result solely of any state competition for corporate franchise revenues.
Of course, diluting the enforcement mechanisms and remedies
available could be beneficial if they are too harsh.
Unnecessary or
excessive regulation could amount to a tax on innovation or a tax on
companies seeking access to the public capital markets.86 However, there
is zero evidence that the private enforcement of the federal securities laws
was not needed either at the time of the passage of the PSLRA and the
SLUSA, or today. First, there was near unanimity that investor confidence
required supporting regulation and that private litigation was essential to
enforcing the federal securities laws.87 Second, the late 1980s and early

80

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
supra note 27, at 1080.
1d. at 1072-80.

81
Ramirez,
82
83

pub. L. No. 105-353 (1998).

'Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1083-84.
Ramirez, supra note 24, at 43-44 (stating risks facing an active entrepreneur and
including the possibility of ruinous litigation pursued by passive investor). The issue of whether
there is too much liability risk facing entrepreneurs will also be assessed in light of empirical
analyses discussed in Part I1of this article. In short, that Part will demonstrate that there appears
to be too little investor protection and not too much. This is in turn supported by theories of
special interest influence discussed in Part IV of this article which suggest that because CEOs are
85

a small group with concentrated wealth at their disposal, operating in an environment that has low
salience to the public, one could predict the decisively pro-management outcomes yielded by our
current system of corporate federalism.
86

Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors,and ProtectingManagers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DuKE L.J. 945, 976 (1993).
87

Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1082 n. 128.
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1990s were hardly emblematic of a high degree of corporate integrity and
honesty in our capital markets, and have been termed a "sordid time for
financial markets in the United States.""8 Finally, lax conduct quickly
followed the diminution of private enforcement, and empirical evidence
demonstrates that auditors, in particular, responded to the PSLRA and the
SLUSA in predictable fashion: they allowed the spoliation of audit quality
so that CEOs could increase current income and thus their own compensation. 89 As such, it appears that the PSLRA and the SLUSA led directly to
the spate of accounting-driven securities frauds that plagued our capital
markets in the 1990s and thereafter.' For the first time ever, federal law
restricted investor rights under state law, turning the federal securities laws
on their head. 9
The end of private securities litigation as a constraint on
management is not the only element of federal law favoring the
prerogatives of the CEO. CEOs of public companies have the unique
privilege of picking their own nominal supervisors-the board of
directors. 92 Under the federal proxy rules (applicable to all publicly traded
corporations), only management (i.e., the CEO) has the power to use
corporate funds to solicit proxy votes for its slate of director candidates. 93
As Professor Tom Joo has demonstrated, even if a shareholder mounts a
proxy challenge, there are rules that systematically load the dice in favor

88
1d.
9

at 1089.
' Lee & Mande, supra note 44.
9'See Douglas Guerrero, The Root of CorporateEvil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at
37 ("It appears that ... highly placed executives used their power.., to achieve financial targets
fraudulently, boost the stock price, and further enrich themselves via compensation schemes that
rewarded those achievements."); see also THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST
AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 6 (2003) (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from

lax monitoring by boards, led to an unprecedented loss of investor confidence).
91
Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1059-60 n. 13. Historically, the federal securities operated
only to expand investor rights because federal remedies were cumulative with any state law rights
of recovery. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that
Congress enacted the federal securities laws in order "to rectify perceived deficiencies in
common-law protections"). After SLUSA, federal law now operates to destroy state law private
rights of action. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503
(2006) (holding that SLUSA preempted class action relief for plaintiffs alleging fraudulent
inducement to hold securities, and thereby destroyed such claims).
92
"The CEO typically holds ultimate control over management and decisive control over
the selection of directors." Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in
America: Can Law (and Professionalization) Fix Minor Problems of Internalization,
Externalizationand Governance?,79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 977, 982 n.24 (2005).
93
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-(8)(i)(8) (2006).
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of management. 94 if a mere shareholder wishes to place a person on the
board, the shareholder must absorb the printing costs, postage costs, and
legal costs of mounting a full-blown proxy solicitation, and these costs can
amount to millions of dollars.95 Thus, there is typically only one candidate
for board positions in public corporations, and that candidate is selected by
management.96 This means that the CEO may stack the board with cultural
and social clones in order to maximize compensation.97 Shareholder
democracy is a myth in the U.S., and management interests have worked to
keep it a myth.98
The reductions in investor rights and protections are not limited to
legislative and regulatory promiscuity towards management, as the United
States Supreme Court has also turned hostile to private claims under the
federal securities laws. 99 Beginning in the early 1990s, the Court began to

4Joo, supra note 28, at 735. Professor Joo identifies the following impediments to
shareholder voting power: federal proxy rules that prohibit inclusion of shareholder proposals
relating to board membership within management's proxy, meaning dissident shareholders must
bear the steep costs of their own proxy challenge; and authorization of brokers to vote shares
within client accounts-invariably voting with management-unless they receive contrary
instructions. Id. at 758-60.
95
1d. In addition, the management may spend corporate funds to resist shareholder
proposals. Designed by Committee: CorporateGovernance, THE ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002,
at 71 (recounting a proxy contest at Hewlett-Packard in which the company spent $150 million
to fend off a proxy challenge brought by the son of a company founder, Walter Hewlett).
96Designedby Committee,supra note 95, at 71 ("The CEO puts up the candidates, no one
runs against them and management counts the votes.") (quoting shareholder activist Nell Minow
of the Corporate Library). One commentator has stated that the incidence of electoral challenges
to incumbent management is "extremely rare" and that the incidence of successful challenges is
practically "negligible." Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise 1, 10
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Oct. 2005), available at http://ssm.comabstract=829804.
Walter Hewlett, for example, lost his challenge, despite having the prodigious advantages of a
board seat and being heir to a founder. Steve Lohr, Suit AgainstHewlett Deal is Dismissed,N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C 1.
97
Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why
Diversity Lags in America's Boardroomsand What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1583, 1589-91, 1613 (2004) (concluding that "CEOs play the game of homosocial reproduction
when selecting directors" and thereby increase their compensation).
9
See generally supra note 28 (stating that corporate democracy is a myth). Recently,
management interests have trumped the SEC's efforts to break the stranglehold that management
has over the proxy machinery and therefore voting power within the public corporation. Parker,
supra note 22, at 10 (stating that ferocious opposition from corporate CEOs had stifled proxy
reform, leading to management power over the director selection process and higher
compensation).
99See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,739 (1975) ("[L]itigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that
which accompanies litigation in general."). Rule lOb-5 is the broadest federal remedy for
securities fraud. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) (outlawing fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities).
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seriously prune the private rights of action available under the federal
securities laws.I °° In 1991, the Court narrowed the statute of limitations
applicable to federal securities fraud cases.'' Three years later, the Court
eliminated liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud. °2 Then in
1995, the Court limited investor remedies under the Securities Act of
1933.103 One commentator has noted that: "In forty federal securities law
decisions, the Court decided thirty-two cases in favor of defendants, and in
almost every one, significantly narrowed the reach of the federal securities
laws." '04 Most recently, the Court broadly read the preemptive reach of the
SLUSA to protect management of public corporations from class actions
based upon state law claims0 5 and has used the causation requirements of
securities claims to limit investor rights." 6 Simply put, the Court's
approach to private securities litigation evinces deep hostility to investor
rights.
Predictably, all of these pro-management outcomes led to a crisis in
corporate confidence---culminating in a parade of corporate corruption
scandals in 2001 and 2002.107 The public's gaze focused on corporate
governance deficiencies.'
With elections looming, Congress rushed

'"°Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1069-70.
' 01Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991)
(holding that statute of limitations for federal securities fraud is one year from the date of the
discovery of the fraud and in no event more than three years from the date of the fraud).
'° 2Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 183
(1994) (holding that aiding and abetting securities fraud is not actionable in federal private claim).
l"3Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 567 (1995) (holding that express rescission
rights of investors purchasing securities is only available to those purchasing in a public offering).
"Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Descriptionof the Arduous, and Now
Often FatalJourneyfor Plaintiffs in FederalSecurities Law Actions, 65 U. CN.L. REv. 3, 6
(1996).
"°5Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) (holding
that class action for shareholders of public company cannot pursue claims under state law).
1
6°Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Bruno, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs seeking to
recover under the federal securities laws must show "economic loss"). Professor Michael
Kaufman has noted that this requirement of "economic loss" is not in the legislation nor in the
legislative history, and "raises the specter of result-oriented reasoning." Michael J. Kaufman, At
a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 48-49 (2005).
"See supra note 27. Professor Steinberg raised the possibility that the securities law had
turned too far in favor of management in early 2002: "the risk and irony of the tripartite action
taken by Congress, the courts, and the SEC [is that] [iun seeking to enhance capital formation and
alleviating the burdens placed on business by the threat of vexatious litigation, the scales may be
tipped disproportionately against investor protection" which may make raising capital more
difficult for business. Marc I. Steinberg, CurtailingInvestor Protection Under the Securities
Laws: Goodfor the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 354 (2002).
I0 8Ramirez, supra note 24, at 31-33.
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through the SOX "reforms" that passed the Senate by a vote of 97-0."1°
Almost immediately scholars voiced concerns about the efficacy of the
SOX. " 0 And, literally on the day the SOX was signed, reactionary forces
began to cut back on its reforms."' This pattern continued, 12z and
ultimately short-circuited the SEC's proxy reform initiative." 3 Many of the
SOX reforms seemed to codify practices that were employed by Enron and
others; thus, it was known such reforms would not prevent future Enrons." 4
Meanwhile, reforms that enjoyed empirical support languished." 5 Thus,
the SOX reforms have been largely ineffective in stopping corporate
abuses." 6 Perhaps the most compelling indictment of the SOX reforms is

'"gShailagh Murray & John D. McKinnon, Senate PassesTough FraudBill in Unanimous
Vote, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, at Al ("[L]awmakers voted 97-0 to establish sweeping new
powers to target corporate fraud.").
10 E.g., Ramirez, supra note 24, at 64 (stating that the SOX may turn out to be a "political
fraud").
"Compare
.
Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 3763, 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 543, availableat 2002 WL 31046071 (" [T]he legislative purpose of section 1514A
.. is to protect against company retaliation for lawful cooperation with investigations... not to
define the scope of investigative authority." Thus, the President decided to "construe section
1514A(a)(1)(B) as referring to investigations authorized by the rules of the Senate or the House
of Representatives and conducted for a proper legislative purpose."), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(I)(B)
(2006)) (providing whistleblowers protection against retaliation for providing information "when
the information or assistance is provided to or the investigation is conducted by . . . (B) any
Member of Congress or any committee of Congress").
" 2 See supra note 29.
'See generally supra notes 20 & 28 (stating that many SOX reforms are ineffective).
It is notable that during the time surrounding the enactment of the SOX, there was no significant
effort for reform at the state level. Thompson & Sale, supra note 20, at 876. In Delaware, the
primary response was to forestall further federal encroachment; not any concern with possible
weaknesses in Delaware corporate governance. Jones, supra note 9, at 643-46. This suggests that
at least in times of economic or financial crisis the political source for more exacting demands
upon manangement is the federal government, responding to broad nationwide constituiencies in
favor of financial stability and investor confidence. In political equilibrium, Congress remains
sidelined, and state laxity for managers is the norm. See id. at 644-47, 654-56.
" 4Janis Sarra, Rose Colored Glasses, OpaqueFinancialReporting, and InvestorBlues:
Enronas Con andthe Vulnerability of CanadianCorporateLaw, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 715,728
(2002) (stating that thirteen of fifteen Enron directors were independent); Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld,
What Makes Great Boards Great, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept. 2002, at 106-08 (contending, for
example, that many of theetmost notable corporate failures had independent boards). Enron also
had a financial expert on its audit committee, as required by SOX. Dan Feldstein, The Fall of
Enron, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2002, at 1 (discussing the fact that the chair of the Enron audit
committee was a former Dean of the Stanford Business School).
.. Ramirez, supra note 97, at 1587-90.
. 6 nfra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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to follow the money; CEO power seems to have been largely unaffected as
compensation for senior executives continues to soar."17
Recent events illustrate just how weak American corporate governance standards have become. In the summer of 2006, it became clear that
thousands of public corporations were backdating options grants to past
dates when their stock was trading lower, to maximize payoffs to their
senior executives." 8 While backdating may not be illegal if it is both
appropriately disclosed and in accordance with tax law, by the end of the
summer two criminal cases had been filed against executives at Brocade
Communicatibns and Comverse Technology." 9 Moreover, by 2007, over
200 companies (including Apple, Inc.) disclosed that their options practices
were under investigation. 120 Rigging options grants to maximize payoff to
executives by picking some low price point in the past as a fantasy and
fraudulent grant date is like "stealing money from the company and
shareholders."'121 It appears that this occurred systematically over a period
of ten years throughout corporate America. 22 Such practices seem more
about the crass enrichment of executives than creating any incentive for

117See supra note 4. If compensation is the litmus test of CEO power, then the legal
indulgences of the 1980s and 1990s have served to greatly empower the CEO of the public
company. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of U.S. Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 283, 287 (2005) (finding that the proportion of S&P 500 profits going to top
executive compensation approximately doubled as a percentage of profits from 1993 to 2003).
"'Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdatingof Options Widespread,N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2006, at C I (reporting on an academic study finding "[m]ore than 2,000 companies appear to have
used backdated stock options to sweeten their top executives' pay packages").
.. Phantom of the Options, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2006, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/200608/24/opinion/edoption.php.
2
Jessica Guynn, Ex-Apple Execs in SEC Crosshairs;Deal Likely With Former CFO;
Counsel Faces Suit, SAN FRAN. CHRONiCLE, Apr. 23, 2007, at C-i, available at http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/04/23/BUGCUPDU8N 17.dtl&hw=ex+apple&
sn=001&sc=1000.
2
' Carolyn Said, Possible Options Scams at Several Local Companies, SF CHRON.,
May 6, 2006 (quoting compensation expert Fred Whittlesey). "It is stealing, in effect. It is
ripping off shareholders in an unconscionable way." Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter
of Timing: Five More Companies Show Questionable Options Pattern-ChipIndustry's KLATencorAmong Firms with GrantsBefore Stock-Price Jumps-A 20 Milliion-to-OneShot, WALL
ST. J., May 22, 2006, at Al (quoting former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt).
22
Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern
Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 82 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with The
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law) ("[W]e find evidence suggesting that backdating is the
major source of the abnormal stock return patterns around executive stock option grants."). "[W]e
... estimate that 29.2% of firms at some point engaged in manipulation of grants to top executives
between 1996 and 2005." Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fractionof Stock Option Grants
to Top Executive have been Backdated or Manipulated? 23 (Working Paper, July 14, 2006),
availableat http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants- 11-01 -2006.pdf (last visited Sept. 15,
2006).
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performance; indeed, one company backdated options grants to enrich a
dead executive.' 2 3 The mere fact that this kind of scam was occurring at
publicly traded companies at all, suggests that corporate governance is not
operating to reduce CEO autonomy (and thus agency costs) to acceptable
levels. 24
'
Overall, considering the legal trajectory of corporate governance law
for publicly held companies, it is not surprising that investment experts like
John Bogle see a "pathological mutation" in our system of capitalism that
exalts the interests of the CEO over all others. 25 CEO primacy is a direct
outcome of the system of corporate governance law that devolved in the
1980s and 1990s into a dictatorship of management, by management, and
for management. 2 6 At both the state and federal level, corporate
governance in the 1980s and 1990s became a parade of managerial
indulgences. 27 At every turn, legislators,judges, and regulators eliminated
or diluted constraints on the power of management. 28 One must believe
that the best means of controlling agency costs is to grant the agent
unfettered discretion in order to believe that corporate federalism yields
optimal outcomes.' 29 Traditionally, some level of judicial deference to
management was manifest in the business judgment rule; recently, that
concept has succumbed to a new, more promiscuous paradigm of CEO
power unencumbered by virtually any civil liability. 3 ° The fact that this

. 23Allen Wastler, Fat Cat Sleaze Escapes Our Outrage, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 22,
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/22/commentary/wastler/index.htm ("Even a
dead man was getting a piece of the pie.").
124 0n the contrary, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has termed options backdating to be
"the ultimate in greed." Forelle & Bandler, supra note 121.
"2Seesupra note 1, at 28.
126Supra notes 65-106 and accompanying text.
27

1 1d.
128id"

29

' See Michael Jensen & William Menkling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) ("[Ilt is generally
impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal
decisions from the principal's viewpoint."). The problem of agency costs within the corporation
has bedeviled shareholders and scholars from the very incipiency of corporate power; in fact,
agency costs are inherent to the issuance of corporate equity. Id. at 312-13; see also JOHN
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY xviii (2003). Controlling agency costs
is key to the economic basis of the corporation. Jensen & Menkling, supra, at 357.
'"0 As recently as 1983, authorities stated that the business judgment rule protected
management only when they act with a "reasonable basis." HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (1983). Even after the enhanced SOX criminal
provisions took effect, there remain gaps in the degree to which criminal law can serve as an
effective means of reducing agency costs and assuring that corporations adhere to legal mandates.
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of Reform
Versus Power, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), availableat http://works.bepress.com/
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occurred at both the state and federal level suggests that the problem
transcends corporate federalism and any debate about the race to the bottom
versus the race to the top.
II. THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
At the same time, there is an emerging science of corporate governance that exists independently of any debate regarding special interest
influence or any race either way at the state level.' 31 Instead, this body of
evidence empirically tests the outcomes of competing systems of corporate
governance or specific elements of corporate governance. 132 The studies
test the impact of corporate governance on macroeconomic performance
across nations, or the impact of specific innovations on corporate financial
performance. 3 3 This emerging interdisciplinary science of corporate

mary-ramirez/1 (showing that whistleblower protection after SOX is still largely illusory); Mary
Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Economic Reform After the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 34
LOYOLA (CHICAGO) L.J. 359,427 (2003) (finding that criminal liability has been diluted, in a way
not addressed by SOX, through downward sentencing departures granted by judges).
13
1It is clear that corporate governance can influence the functioning of the corporation
in terms of financial performance and macroeconomic output. Nick Bradley, CorporateGovernanceScoring and the Link Between CorporateGovernanceand Performance,CORP. Gov., Jan.
2004, at 8 (2004) (stating that "the good news" is that there are links between corporate
governance and performance, but it is difficult to isolate the precise mechanisms driving such
links). It is also clear that these links have only recently been integrated at all into corporate
governance law, and then only in a most general sense. See, e.g., John Coffee, The Rise of
Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separationof Ownership and
Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1,64-66 (2001) (stating that empirical record "does fairly suggest that
securities markets cannot grow or expand to their full potential under a purely voluntary legal
regime" and that mandatory law is needed to prevent market "crashes").
132E.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and CorporateValuation, 57 J.FIN.
1147, 1166-69 (2002) (finding evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better
protection of minority shareholders and higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders,
especially in countries with weak investor protections); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance,
106 J. POE. ECON. 1113 (1998) (providing empirical evidence that common law systems have
superior shareholder protections than civil law systems, and that greater shareholder protections
gives rise to more dispersed share ownership structures and larger capital markets); Rafael La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (arguing that
countries with weak investor protections tend to have stunted capital markets).
133Compare Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth,
88 AM. ECON. REv. 537 (1998) (relating economic growth to financial development); Maurice
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversificationand Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 1310 (1994)
(finding that the ability of investors to diversify through markets encourages growth), with Ash
Demirgiiq-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Financeand Firm Growth, 53 J.FIN. 210 (1998)
(finding that firms in countries with active stock markets were able to obtain greater funds to
finance growth); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, FinancialDependenceand Growth, 88
AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (finding that industries dependent on external finance are more
developed in countries with better protection of external investors).
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governance means that there is an emerging vision of optimal corporate
governance.' 34 This emerging science serves a dual purpose: not only does
it provide aspirational guidance, it also serves as a test of the current
system's ability to deliver appropriate corporate governance standards. 3
Instead of theorizing or speculating about sound corporate governance,
corporate governance is now studied in terms of actual outcomes, across
disciplines.' 36 These empirical analyses have covered a wide range of
corporate governance issues.
For example, given the centrality of information to the functioning
of markets, one may be tempted to conclude that any disclosure of
corporate information is beneficial to the functioning of financial markets
and the corporation as an institution. 37
' However, empirical studies suggest
this theoretical supposition is flawed. 3 Instead, corporations providing
frequent earnings guidance seem inclined to forgo expenditures that yield
long-term profits in order to inflate earnings over the short term. 3 9 Thus,
in one recent study, companies that provided frequent earnings guidance
were found to have spent less on research and development than those
companies that provided less guidance, and therefore to have suffered
stunted financial performance over the long term.14 It appears that the
flawed system of American corporate governance gives CEOs the
opportunity to forgo long-term financial performance in favor of short-term
profitability (and presumably higher CEO pay).

"Analyses of optimal corporate governance standards appear in economics journals,
financejournals, law journals, and accounting journals. See supra notes 17,89,34, 122, & 13233.
3
'Professor Romano relies upon an empirical analysis of corporate governance standards
to impugn the SOX, but no scholar has thus far used this body of evidence to impugn our current
system of corporate federalism and to articulate a new regulatory framework that can impound
this learning into law in a systematic way. See Romano, supra note 20, at 1529-43.
136E.g., M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of CorporateGovernance
from Wall St. to Main St. Outside Directors,Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and
Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12-13 (2003) (overview of empirical
evidence regarding governance structures and diversity associated with financial performance).
37
' The Sounds ofSilence, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2006, at 79-80 (noting that defenders
of corporate earnings guidance argue that disclosure of "more information is always better").
'Mei Cheng et al.,
EarningsGuidance and ManagerialMyopia, Nov. 2005, available
at http://papers.ssrn.conmsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=851545. This study involved a sample of
989 companies across 10 industries. Id. at 11.
39
1d. at 2 ("We find that ... dedicated guiders spend significantly less on R&D than
occasional guiders, which suggests that earnings guidance is indeed associated with myopic
behavior with respect to R&D spending.").
40
' d. at 29 ("[W]e document that dedicated guiders invest less in R&D... and have
significantly lower [return on assets] growth than occasional guiders.").
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Corporate governance should operate to limit CEO autonomy and to
protect investors; this will lead to superior outcomes, because if investors
are confident that their reasonable expectations will be secured by law, they
will invest at a lower cost to entrepreneurs.' 4 ' Thus, investor protection is
associated with higher economic growth. 4 2 One study found that
companies with superior corporate governance measures (based upon an
assessment of twenty-four different corporate governance elements that
operated to restrict shareholder rights) enjoyed superior stock market
valuations.143 This is consistent with other studies linking various indices
of shareholder rights to financial performance. " Weak investor protection

"1 LaPorta et al. describe this phenomenon in Investor Protection and Corporate
Valuation:
When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing
to pay more for financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because
they recognize that, with better legal protection, more of the firm's profits will
come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to being expropriated by
the entrepreneur who controls the firm. By limiting the expropriation, the law
raises the price that securities fetch in the marketplace. In turn, this enables
more entrepreneurs to finance their investments externally, leading to the
expansion of financial markets.
La Porta et al., Investor Protection, supra note 132, at 1147. Financial market development is
key to economic growth. See also generally supra note 131 (stating that corporate governance
influences the functioning of the corporation in terms of financial performance and macroecoomic
output).
42

Rui Castro et al., Investor Protection,Optimal Incentives, andEconomic Growth, 119
Q.J. EcON. 1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004) ("[W]e employ standard techniques from the empirical growth literature to investigate the nature of the relation between investor protection and
growth. Consistent with earlier studies, we find a positive association.").
43
1 Paul Gompers et al., CorporateGovernance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107,
108-09 (2003). The index used in this study consisted of twenty-four factors of corporate
governance that the authors broke down into five groups: (1) factors associated with delaying
hostile threats to corporate control; (2) factors associated with voting rights; (3) factors designed
to protect officers and directors from liability or termination; (4) other antitakeover protections;
and (5) state laws bearing upon takeovers. Id. at 110-14. One of the factors included in this study
is charter amendments to limit director liability for breach of the duty of care. Id. at 148-49.
Prior studies also found that this particular factor is destructive of shareholder value. Bradley &
Schipani, supra note 76, at 43.
'"For example, the index used in the Gompers study, supra note 143, has since been
refined into an apparently more powerful entrenchment index. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What
Matters in CorporateGovernance?4 (Mar. 2005) (finding that staggered boards, supermajority
voting requirements, poison pills, golden parachute provisions, and limits on shareholder voting
power, all of which entrench management, accounted for most of the drag on financial
performance attributable to weak corporate governance), availableat http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=593423. Other authors have tested the efficacy of other more expansive
corporate governance indices. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance
and Company Performance 3 (Dec. 7, 2005) (finding that a governance index based upon 51
elements influences operating performance, valuation and cash payouts to shareholders), available
at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/ Corporate%20Governance% 20Study%201.04.pdf.
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leads to a shift in the corporate balance of power in favor of management,
which will increase self-dealing and lead to higher compensation for
executives.145 If executive compensation is the "canary in the coal mine"
signaling pervasively weak corporate governance, then there is cause for
serious concern in the U.S., where CEO compensation relative to earnings
has doubled over the past ten years.' 46 In the long run, securing the reasonable expectations of investors through legal protection serves the economy
in general and entrepreneurs in particular, while also operating to limit
agency costs.
Investor protection entails mandatory disclosure of material
information to the investing public-such as that required under the federal
securities laws in the U.S.' 47 To the extent investors have access to reliable
investment information, they should theoretically be more willing to invest,
meaning entrepreneurs and businesses will enjoy a lower cost of capital.48
While one may expect private contracts to be the most effective way to
assure an efficient means of securing appropriate information flows, in fact,
such contracting appears prohibitively costly. 149 Moreover, management
is likely to be more focused on shareholder maximization if they are
required to disclose financial information periodically. 50 Empirical evidence now supports these theoretical conclusions. Specifically, Professors
Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen found that when the applicability
of the federal mandatory disclosure regime was extended to firms traded in
over-the-counter markets, those firms enjoyed excess returns and gains in
' 45 Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governanceand Control, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) (stating that corporate
governance must stem self-dealing by managers and that soaring executive compensation in the
United States is difficult to justify).
16See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 117, at 287 (finding that the proportion of S&P
500 profits going to top executive compensation approximately doubled as a percentage of profits
from 1993 to 2003). More than excess compensation may result from weak corporate governance.
For example, the Gompers study found that weak corporate governance was also associated with
inferior investment outcomes, as unconstrained CEOs engaged in acquisitions and investments
that did not maximize shareholder value. Gompers et al., supra note 143, at 132-37.
147Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964
SecuritiesActs Amendments, 121 Q.J. EON. 399, 447 (2006) ("[Tlhese results should cause
policy-makers to question the basis of recent calls to repeal U.S. federal mandatory disclosure
requirements.").
1481d.
at 399-400.
1491d.
at 405.
1501d. at 406-07 (citing Andrei Schleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and
Equity Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (2002) (articulating a theoretical financial model that
accounts for the following empirical facts associated with better shareholder protection: that it
yields larger firms that are more valuable and plentiful; that it lowers the diversion of profits and
raises dividends; and, that it yields a lower concentration of ownership and more developed
financial markets)).
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operating performance when they commenced compliance as well as in the
period following the relevant legislative proposals.''
Previous studies had reached divergent conclusions regarding the
efficacy of the federal mandatory disclosure regime. 5 2 Yet these studies
suffered from an inability to isolate the impact of the federal securities laws
from exogenous events that impacted stock prices generally.' 53 Professors
Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen are able to avoid these problems
by using the extension of the federal securities laws pursuant to the 1964
Securities Act Amendments to compare the performance of affected firms
against firms listed on the major stock exchanges already covered by
federal mandatory disclosure requirements.' 54 While their study is thus
unique, it is consistent with other empirical analyses that have attempted to
isolate the impact of the mandatory disclosure regime.'5 5 "Overall, the
results suggest that the benefits of the 1964 Amendments substantially
outweighed the cost of complying with this law as measured by stock
returns. '156 In addition, their study concludes that the 1964 Amendments
had a positive impact on operating performance "consistent with the
hypothesis that mandatory disclosure laws can cause managers to focus
more narrowly on the maximization of shareholder value."' 57
51

' Greenstone et al., supra note 147, at 446-47.
52

Compare George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus.

117, 124 (1964) ("[Sltudies suggest that the S.E.C. registration requirements had no important
effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public."), with Irwin Friend & Edward S.
Herman, The SEC Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 389 (1964) ("We doubt that any
person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of stock-market practices between the preand post-SEC periods could lament or underrate the success of the new legislation in eradicating
many of (the] weaknesses in our capital markets."). The mainstream law and economics approach
to these conflicting authorities was to ignore one, and to embrace the laissez-faire outcome of the
other. RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OFLAw § 15.8 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that economists "widely accepted" that mandatory disclosure for new issues does not help investors).
53
' As noted in the study by Greenstone et al.:
We compare the stock returns and changes in operating performance of affected
OTC firms with NYSEIAMEX firms. We also contrast these outcomes among
OTC firms that are differentially affected by the 1964 Amendments. This
research design provides an opportunity to avoid confounding the effect of the
law with unobserved shocks to all firms' stock returns and operating
performance. This feature of the analysis is an improvement on much of the
previous empirical research on mandatory disclosure laws (e.g., Stigler [ 19641,
Friend and Herman [1964], Robbins and Werner [1964], and Jarrell [1981]).
Greenstone et al., supra note 147, at 401 (internal references omitted).

1541d.
5
5'E.g., Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 SecuritiesAct on Investor Informationand

the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 295, 313 (1989) (finding that mandatory
disclosure served to lower risk of new issues and, in at least some cases, raised returns).
56
1 Greenstone et al., supra note 147, at 403.
'571d. at 447.
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Given that investor protection is essential to securing the appropriate
economic and financial operation of the public corporation, it would be
natural to consider private enforcement and private rights of action as
necessary components of an investor protection regime.' In fact, empirical evidence now demonstrates that "standards of liability facilitating
investor recovery of losses are associated with larger stock markets."' 5 9
This conclusion is supported by a transnational comparison of 49 nations
in terms of financial development and strength of investor remedies,
compiled with input from attorneys from around the world."6 The authors
compared liability standards by focusing on the degree of culpability of the
defendant-ranging from fraud to strict liability-as a means of assessing
strength of investor rights. 16' Importantly, this study regarding the appropriate role of private securities enforcement tracks the outcome of a parallel
study of private remedies for self-dealing under corporate law: "the results
[of this study] suggest that giving aggrieved shareholders the standing to
sue, access to information to identify self-dealing, and a low burden of
proof would deter self-dealing and promote stock market development." 162

58

' Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1082-83. Finance professors state the justification for
broader investor remedies as follows:
Efficiency considerations suggest that the lowest cost provider of information
about a security should collect and present this information, and be held
accountable if he omits or misleads. In the Grossman and Hart model (1980),
for example, the lowest cost providers are not the investors, but the issuers,
distributors, and accountants. An efficient system would provide them with
incentives to collect and present information to investors, and would hold them
liable if they do not. In securities laws, this strategy generally takes the form of
disclosure requirements and liability standards that make it cheaper for investors
to recover damages when information is wrong or omitted--the two features we
try to capture empirically.
Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in SecuritiesLaws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 5-10 (2006).
159 More specifically:
The results on liability standards are also consistently strong. The estimated
coefficients predict that a two-standard deviation increase in this variable
(roughly the distance from Denmark to the United States) is associated with an
increase of 0.23 percentage points in the extemal-market-to-GDP ratio, a 28%
rise in listed firms per capita, a 1.88 increase in the IPO-to-GDP ratio, a 6.6
percentage point drop in the block premium, a 0.75 point improvement in the
access-to-equity index, a decrease of 6.6 percentage points drop in ownership
concentration (but with a t-stat of only 1.58), and a 45.8 points increase in the
volume-to-GDP ratio.
La Porta et al., supra note 158, at 19.
"Id. at 5.
Mid.at 7.
62
1 Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing 38 (Apr. 2006),
availableat http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working-papers/SelfDealApril 13.pdf.
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in favor of investors
Thus, it appears that facilitating private rights of action
63
1
governance.
corporate
sound
of
element
is a key
An additional issue that has been studied in depth is the effect of
board diversity upon corporate financial performance. "[H]uman resource
theorists have supported expectations for improved performance and
increased value for companies providing programs that integrate diversity
initiatives since at least the early 1990s. " 65 In general, diversity at the
board level is associated with superior corporate governance and better
financial performance.'6 6 Diversity has been shown to enhance cognitive
functioning of groups and to disrupt groupthink, a dynamic characterized
by mindless adherence to group norms and assumptions.'67 Left to their
own discretion, it appears that CEOs specifically engage in homosocial

63

1 The Djankov study, id., was undertaken by a team that included many of the authors

of the study assessing private securities enforcement, supra note 158, as well as many of the other
studies associating investor protections with superior financial and economic outcomes, supra
note 132. As such they addressed the multicollinearity challenges posed by using different indices
to determine stock market development. They concluded that "both disclosure and the power to
enforce contracts through private litigation [appeared] important." Djankov, supra note 162, at
34.
'"David A. Carter et al., CorporateGovernance, BoardDiversity and Firm Value, 38
FIN. REV. 33, 36 (2003) ("[D]iversity produces more effective problem solving. While
heterogeneity may initially produce more conflict ... the variety of perspectives that emerges
cause decision makers to evaluate more alternatives and more carefully explore the consequences
of these alternatives.").
'65Fields & Keys, supra note 19, at 12. See also Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the
Boardroom,6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85 (2000) (summarizing theoretical and empirical case that
law should encourage businesses to embrace diversity).
'66Carter et al., supra note 164, at 51 ("After controlling for size, industry, and other
corporate governance measures we find statistically significant positive relationships between the
presence of women or minorities on the board and firm value .... "); see also DAVID A. BROWN
ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARD: NOT JUST THE RIGHT THING... BUT THE BRIGHT THING i-ii (The
Conference Bd. of Canada, May 2002) (finding that gender diversity enhanced corporate
governance); Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom 19
(European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 57, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=594506 ("Overall, our results suggest quite
strongly that in boards with relatively more women, more directors participate in decision-making,
which may enhance their effectiveness.").
16See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
UnderstandingBoards of Directorsas StrategicDecision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 489, 494-97 (1999) (stating that heterogeneous boards benefit from cognitive conflict that
results in a more thorough consideration of problems and solutions); see also Marlene A.
O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306 (2003)
(stating that "social homogeneity on corporate boards harms critical deliberation" and that "the
best way to avoid groupthink is to prevent enclaves of like-minded people from making group
decisions"; therefore, "reform proposals should discourage groupthink by promoting more
diversity on boards in terms of gender, race, class, ethnicity, age, national origin, sexual
orientation, and socio-economic background, as well as expertise and temperament").
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reproduction 6 ' to stock boards with individuals friendly to the CEO's
interests in order to enhance their compensation.'6 9 This natural tendency
is also demonstrated through CEO exploitation of board interlocks (where
networks of CEOs serve on each other's boards) in a way that enhances
their compensation.17 There is, therefore, powerful evidence suggesting
that board diversity leads to superior outcomes in terms of corporate
performance and corporate governance, by disrupting the CEO's ability to
exploit social dynamics such as groupthink and homosocial reproduction.
A further area of inquiry involves antitakeover protections, which
typically operate at the state level to insulate current management from the
pressures of competitive corporate control markets. 7' Such protections
make it difficult to oust incumbent managers from control, which serves to
enhance their power and increase agency costs in the form of higher
Another study found that antitakeover
executive compensation."'

68
' Rosabeth Kanter originally coined the term "homosocial reproduction" to explain why
white male managers seemed inclined towards homogeneity. ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48, 63 (1977). Thus, homosocial reproduction may be a significant factor in disparate treatment of women and minorities throughout the corporate hierarchy.
69
' James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
DemographicSimilarity,and New DirectorSelection, 40 ADMIN. Sc1. Q. 60, 77 (1995) (finding
that when "CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar
to the firm's incumbent CEO"). Westphal and Zajac's study is based upon data from 413
Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from 1986 to 1991. Id. at 61. They define demographic diversity
in terms of age, educational background, tenure with the organization, and insider/outsider status.
Id. at 63-66. Nevertheless, the authors proceed from the assumption that "in-group bias" is "quite
powerful" even when based upon irrelevant factors. Id. at 62. Westphal and Zajac conclude that
cultural homogeneity on the board leads to higher compensation for the CEO. Id. at 79.
1
T°Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J.White, CEO Compensationand Turnover: The Effects
of Mutually Interlocked Boards,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.935, 947-48 (2003) ("[T]he number
of mutual director interlocks is found to be significant and positively associated with total
compensation.").
1
.. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 61, at 404 (stating that most U.S. states have antitakeover statutes and Delaware courts have permitted management to engage in antitakeover
tactics such as poison pills which operate to dilute those attempting to seize control).
72
1 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Corporate Governance and Executive
Pay:Evidencefrom TakeoverLegislation 22 (Nov. 29, 1999) ("We have provided some evidence
that state anti-takeover laws on average raised the total compensation for CEOs. This finding is
consistent with the view that CEOs expropriate what they can from relatively powerless
available at
shareholders and pay themselves more when takeover discipline goes down ...."),
One may have
http://post.economics.harvard.edulfaculty/mullainathanpapersexeccomp.pdf.
expected compensation to go down in the wake of antitakeover legislation, as CEOs would no
longer demand compensation for the risk of takeover. Id.at 2. This would have vindicated the
idea that CEO pay is the result of an optimal contract between principal and agent. Id. at 22.
Instead, the finding of the study tends to confirm a skimming model of CEO compensation. Id.
Importantly, the authors also found that the presence of a large shareholder mitigated pay raises
and was associated with greater incentive compensation innovations in the wake of antitakeover
legislation, as larger shareholders apparently acted more optimally as agents and searched for
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legislation also weakened management incentives to negotiate lower labor
costs generally, as CEOs apparently utilized their enhanced power to favor
co-employees over more distant and less visible shareholders. 17 3 Indeed, it
appears that in general such laws are associated with more lethargic
management as the enhanced entrenchment leads to diminished investment
in plants and lower productivity and profitability.' 74 These facts are
consistent with a slew of studies that demonstrate enhanced CEO power is
closely associated with higher CEO pay, although not enhanced performance.1 75 In all, it appears that antitakeover protections serve to enhance
176
management power and compromise performance.
Board composition has also commanded significant attention from
corporate governance scholars.'77 For example, a staggered board may be
a powerful antitakeover device that operates to frustrate the ability of
outsiders to seize control of a corporation.' 78 There is robust evidence that

substitute forms of discipline. Id. at 23.
'Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A
Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999).
7
1 1More specifically:
We found that antitakeover laws generated rises in blue-collar workers' wages
and even larger rises in white-collar workers' wages. This suggests that
managers prefer to pay workers (especially white-collar ones) higher wages,
which is consistent with stakeholder theories of the firm. However, we found
that these higher wages did not, on net, translate into greater operating
efficiency, suggesting that stakeholder protection did not "pay for itself." We
also found evidence of a decline in the level of both plant creation and
destruction, with little effect on overall firm size.
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the QuietLife? CorporateGovernanceand
ManagerialPreferences, 111 J. POLu. ECON. 1043, 1072 (2003).
175E.g., Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and TopManagement Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGM'T. ScI. 453 (2002) (finding that the
presence of large shareholders, boards with higher equity ownership, and higher firm default risk
are associated with lower compensation); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs
Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without PrincipalsAre, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 920-26 (2001)
(finding more pay-for-luck at firms without a large outside shareholder); Westphal & Zajac, supra
note 169, at 77, 79 (finding that when "CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to
be demographically similar to the firm's incumbent CEO" and compensation increases).
17 6
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1784,
1790 (2006) (showing that the market for corporate control is distorted by staggered boards as
well as golden parachute and other payments to incumbent management, and therefore "leaves
management with considerable slack."). See also supra note 62.
177Fields & Keys, supra note 19, at 4-12 (summarizing literature).
178Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of EntrenchedBoards, June 2004, at
28 (Working Paper) ("We find that, even after controlling for firm value in 1990, having a
staggered board in 1990 is associated with a significantly lower value during the period 19952002. This finding is consistent with staggered boards brining about a lower firm value and not
merely being selected by low-value firms."), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
bebchuk/pdfs/03.Bebchuk-Cohen.Entrenched-Boards.pdf.
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a board that is independent of the CEO enhances corporate valuation.'7 9
Moreover, boards selected without input from the CEO are more
independent, and the corporation achieves a higher market valuation." s
Yet evidence of the efficacy of so-called outside directors (those who are
not otherwise employees of the corporation) is mixed, at best.'' On the
other hand, there is powerful evidence that the separation of CEO and
chairman of the board into two positions reduces agency costs and
enhances firm value.'82 Similarly, there is evidence that an independent
nominating committee for the selection of directors is associated with
superior performance.' 83 As elsewhere, endogeniety problems plague
research in this area, and it is difficult to discern if board composition
drives performance, or performance drives board composition.18 4
Nevertheless, it does appear that board composition that reduces CEO
autonomy is associated with superior outcomes, based upon the best
corporate governance science available.

'Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board
Members: An EmpiricalAnalysis,54 J. FIN. 1829, 1852 (1999) (finding a higher stock market
valuation when the CEO is involved in the director selection process than when the CEO is
involved). Significantly, Shivdasani and Yermack distinguish between outside directors who have
close links to the CEO versus more independent outsiders. Id. at 1831.
8
'
SVarma
found that in the closed-end mutual fund context when directors are selected
without management involvement funds trade at higher valuations relative to net asset value. Raj
Varma, An EmpiricalExamination of Sponsor Influence Over the Board of Directors,38 FIN.
REv. 55, 75 (2003) (finding that closed-end mutual fund sponsors capture boards and that the
market values boards selected without sponsor involvement).
81
1 Compare Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-Correlation
Between Board
Independence and Long Term FinancialPerformance, 27 J. CoRP. L. 231, 233 (2002) (finding
no linkage between proportion of outside directors and various measures of performance), with
Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics,Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of
Debt, 37 J. Acr. &EcON. 315,320 (2004) (finding that firms with more outside directors enjoy
a lower cost of debt).
' 82Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance7-8 (Working Paper, Dec. 7,2004) (on file with author) (summarizing literature and
finding, consistent with that literature, that "firms are more valuable when the CEO and board
chair positions are separate") (citing John E. Core et al., CorporateGovernance, Chief Executive
Compensation,and Firm Performance, 51 J. FiN. ECON. 371, 372 (1999) (finding lower CEO
compensation when CEO and board chair are split); David Yermack, HigherMarket Valuation
forfirms with A Small Board of Directors,40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 (1996) (finding higher firm
valuations when CEO and board chair are split)).
' 31d. at 18, 21-22 (empirical analysis finding that an independent nominating committee
is one of three corporate governance factors "most closely linked" to performance and that it was
a top three factor in terms of return on equity and net profits).
'Fields & Keys, supra note 19, at 5 (summarizing literature); see also Gompers et al.,
supranote 143, at 144-45 (noting inability to eliminate possible operation of some "unobservable
firm characteristic").
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The emerging science of corporate governance also casts doubt on
the efficacy of the SOX reform initiatives. Professor Roberta Romano has
assiduously tested those reforms against the best empirical data regarding
such reforms.' 85 Professor Romano found that the "compelling thrust" of
the empirical literature did not support the section 301 requirement that
public companies have an audit committee composed entirely of outside
directors, as defined by Congress. 186 She also finds "compelling" empirical
support that prohibiting auditors from providing nonaudit services (as
18 7
required by section of 201 of the SOX) does not affect audit quality.
Apparently there is little evidence supporting the efficacy of the
requirement that CEOs and Chief Financial Officers certify the accuracy of
financial statements, as mandated by section 302 of SOX. 181 In short,
Professor Romano concludes that a "brief review of the empirical literature
suggests that a case does not exist for the principal corporate governance
mandates in SOX.' ' 189 Moreover, the one initiative in the SOX that is
supported by empirical evidence, the appointment of a financial expert to
the audit committee, is not a mandate but a disclosure requirement.190
Thus, Professor Romano concludes that the corporate governance
initiatives were "seriously misconceived."' 9

'Specifically, Romano noted:
The gist of the literature, that the proposed mandates would not be effective, was
available to legislators while they were formulating SOX. Yet, it went unnoticed
or was ignored. With the scholarly literature at odds with the proposed
governance mandates being treated as though it did not exist, the quality of the
of decisionmaking that went into the SOX legislative process was, to put it
mildly, less than optimal.
Romano, supra note 20, at 1526-27.
86
' 1d. at 1532 (citing sixteen studies assessing efficacy of independent audit committees).
187
1d. at 1535-37 (citing twenty-five studies addressing the impact of permitting auditors
to provide non-audit services).
88
' 1d. at 1543 (citing two studies with inconsistent findings).
'Romano, supra note 20, at 1543.
'9°d.at 1532.
' 91 ld. at 1602. There is empirical evidence to the contrary. Brown & Caylor find that
many of the SOX reform initiatives are associated with superior financial performance. Brown
& Caylor, supra note 182, at 31 ("We find that independent board of directors, nominating
committees and compensation committees are associated with good firm performance."); see also
Reena Aggarwal & Robin Williamson, Did the New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate
GovernanceAttributes? (Working Paper, Feb. 12, 2006) (finding that SOX reforms enhanced
firm values in a "statistically and economically significant" way but simultaneity issues may mean
that "more valuable firms opt for better governance"), availableat http://www.issproxy.comlpdf/
Reemaaggarwal-GovernanceandFirmPerformanceO2O6.pdf. It is notable that the authors declined
to opine regarding the necessity of the SOX reforms because it appeared that the market rewarded
sound voluntary corporate governance during the pre-Sox period of 2002-2003 before the reforms
were mandatory. Id. at 28.
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Professor Romano is correct in her diagnosis but not in her
prescription. 9 2 She argues (again) in favor of the current system of
corporate federalism with a limited role for Congress. 9' 3 The problem with
this approach is that there is little evidence that states are at all attentive to
the very body of empirical data that Professor Romano relies upon to
impugn the SOX.' 94 For example, it is difficult to find any empirical data
supporting the destruction of the duty of care, yet the Delaware legislature
has led the nation in doing exactly that.' 95 Similarly, when the Delaware
courts permitted management to obtain shareholder approval for incentive
compensation programs without disclosing management's valuation of such
programs, there was no mention of any empirical data. 196 Nor has Delaware97
1
or any other state since exhibited any sensitivity to empirical outcomes.
192

My agreement with Professor Romano's diagnosis is limited by the recognition that
corporate federalism had degenerated to such an extent that something had to be done by the
summer of 2002. 1 agree that Congress could have crafted better legislation, and that it would
have been well-advised to heed the science of corporate governance. Unfortunately, corporate

federalism had yielded such power to CEOs during the 1980s and 1990s, that the market reacted
favorably to SOX, even though it may have been a suboptimal solution to the problem of
management run amok. See supra text accompanying note 190. Thus, my agreement with
Professor Romano's diagnosis is strictly focused on the need for greater harmony between
corporate governance standards and the best learning available.
93

' See supra note 20.

"9For example, in the recent Disney litigation, the Delaware courts had a clear
opportunity to vindicate extant empirical evidence showing the importance of investor protections
and the need to curb CEO power, but choose instead to be oblivious to this evidence and to allow
management to conduct itself without any risk of civil liability for any degree of negligence. See
In re Walt Disney Corp. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
195
on the contrary, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick specified duty of care insulation as one
indicia of weak corporate governance that they found associated with inferior performance. See
Gompers et al., supra note 143, at 148-49. Moreover, Bradley and Schipani found that Delaware
firms generally lost value when the Delaware legislature provided for enhanced insulation with
respect to the duty of care, and that firms that took advantage of such insulation declined further
in value. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 76, at 73-74. It would be inconsistent with any
logic that the destruction of causes of action held by shareholders would be costless. Thus, it
seems the destruction of the duty of care can only be deemed economically suboptimal. See THE
CONFERENCE BD., supra note 90, at 6 (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from
lax monitoring by boards, led to an unprecedented loss of investor confidence during the corporate
corruption crisis of 2001 and 2002).
'96See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. Ch. 1997) (holding that "allegations
of failure to disclose estimated present value calculations (of stock option grants] fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted" when management seeks shareholder approval of
compensation and citing no empirical evidence that this is an economically appropriate outcome).
It is difficult to see how shareholders can control agency costs if they are deprived of the
information that management has regarding the value of options grants. See Jensen & Menkling,
supra note 129, at 357.
97
1 Most recently, the Delaware courts gave meaning to section 102(b)(7) by holding that
to be liable under that provision a plaintiff must show an absence of good faith, meaning:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary
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Certainly, it is the case that some of the state law outcomes discussed above
predate the empirical data suggesting that they are economically and
financially suboptimal outcomes. Nevertheless, there is no apparent
movement by any authority to revise these outcomes--evinced most clearly
by the ill-founded outcomes of recent vintage.' 98 Thus, state legislatures
and courts are guilty of the same obliviousness to empirical evidence as
Congress.
In addition, there is likely a dearth of institutional capabilities within
any of these law-making organs to integrate financial, economic, and
accounting studies into their deliberative process.' 99 Legislators and judges
are not required to have advanced degrees in these areas, nor should they
be. 2' They have jurisdiction over a wide variety of legal issues and have
neither the time nor the expertise for such specialized knowledge. 20 1 It is
hard to imagine a productive debate in the halls of legislatures or the
courthouses of America regarding the appropriate weight to give to the
emerging science of corporate governance in making corporate governance
law.20 2 Even an institution with the resources of the United States Supreme

intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests
of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a
known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.
In re Walt Disney Corp. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 67. Again, the court was oblivious to any
empirical learning regarding optimal corporate governance. See id. Professor Jones argues that
Delaware courts imposed "stricter judicial scrutiny" over management, in an effort to preserve
Delaware's position as the primary source of charters for public companies. Jones, supranote 9,
at 645. She wrote before the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in the Disney case. Apparently, the
Delaware judiciary reverted to its pro-management deference. Id. at 646. Professor Jones musters
convincing evidence that this shift was intended to protect Delaware's corporate law franchise.
Id. at 643-60.
' 98Supra note 197.
'99The sheer volume of research in the science of corporate governance is tremendous.
In fact, "it is impossible to adequately cover even a small percentage of the literature." Fields &
Keys, supra note 19, at 19.
200
E.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I, 111(stating that the qualifications for federal legislature and
federal courts is for the person to be twenty-five years old and a citizen of the United States for
seven years, and not requiring an advanced degree in finance, accounting or economics).
201
See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
137-43 (1955) (articulating basis for agency regulation and including: (1) the need to
professionalize and provide expertise for regulation; (2) regulatory continuity; (3) allow for rapid
adaptation to changing conditions; and (4) reduce special interest influence); STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKINGTHE VICIOUS CIRCLE 12,55-81 (1993) (arguing that regulation is dominated by random
agendas and institutional conflicts that create inconsistencies and uncoordinated regulation and
proposing the creation of a class of super-regulators with specific expertise and experience).
2 2
With respect to the PSLRA, for example, scholars had shown that there was no
litigation explosion, there was no evidence of impaired capital formation, and there was no
showing of extortionate settlements. Yet these were the policy bases for the precipitous
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Court seems unlikely to rest its opinions on the state of empirical data.2 °3
Institutionally, neither legislators norjudges are well suited to interpreting
and integrating the best academic information on corporate governance into
law.
The lack of institutional capability and expertise certainly transcends
the corporate federalism debates about whether there is a race to the top or
the bottom. Neither federal nor state authorities have exhibited any
sensitivity to the emerging science of corporate governance. 2 ° Indeed,
considering the lack of empirical support for the SOX is only the beginning
of legal dysfunction.2 5 Many corporate governance initiatives have not
become law despite enjoying empirical support.20 6 There is an intolerable
chasm between the teachings of corporate governance science and
corporate governance law.20 7 In fact, one empirical study assessing the
impact of shareholder rights and investor protection on the cost of capital
found that the magnitude of departure from an optimal capital structure is
quite large, even in advanced countries, because of suboptimal corporate
governance.2 8 The study was founded on two premises, which the authors
empirically confirmed: first, weaker investor protection leads to more
inside ownership; and second, more inside ownership leads to a higher cost

deregulation of the securities markets that occurred with the substantial destruction of private
enforcement. Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1086-87.
2 3
° For example, in the two most recent Court cases to diminish investor rights, Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006), and Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Bruno, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), the Court ignored all empirical data regarding the importance of
investor protections to corporate performance and economic growth, and instead continued its
relentless march to CEO primacy. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at 1510 (ignoring the empirical record
regarding the economic importance of investor protection in favor of empirically unsound rhetoric
from the 1970s about the supposed "vexatiousness" of deterring securities fraudfeasors); Dura
Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 346-47 (finding plaintiffs' claim legally insufficient without regard to
empirical data on importance of investor protections).
2
'Supra notes 197, 203.
2
°Supra notes 197, 202, & 203.
2
"Ramirez, supra note 97, at 1603-11 (discussing the effects of politics, power, and
economics on reform initiatives).
2
"See Charles P. Himmelberg et al., Investment, Protection,Ownership and the Cost of
Capital39 (Nat'l Bank of Belgium, Working Paper No. 25, May 2002) (" [tihere is still substantial
room for improvement in the design of the legal and regulatory environment for financial
contracting and corporate governance" even in developed countries like the U.S. because the
continued presence of inside ownership suggests that business managers hold too much costly
undiversified risk), availableat http://www.nbb.beldoc/oc/repec/reswpp/WP25.pdf.
208
1d. at 38 (stating that the magnitude of the gap between ideal corporate governance and
actual corporate governance law, as evinced by the persistence of suboptimal corporate capital
structures in terms of inside ownership, is "potentially quite large."); see also Gompers et al.,
supra note 143, at 145 (finding that potential gains from improvements in corporate governance
"would be enormous").
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of capital. 20 9 The finding of too much inside ownership (and therefore an
unnecessarily high cost of capital) stems from the fact that weak investor
protection leaves entrepreneurs holding too much firm-specific risk that
they cannot diversify. 2 0 Thus, the gap between optimal corporate governance and corporate governance law has been empirically demonstrated.
Beyond that, however, deficiencies are manifest across corporate
governance issues. The current system of corporate governance law looks
nothing like emerging corporate governance science.2"1' There is no restriction on management's earnings guidance.2 12 There is no standard for
encouraging more diverse boards to disrupt homosocial reproduction.2 3
Antitakeover protections serve to entrench management across the
nation."' Congress and the United States Supreme Court have gutted
private securities claims, even though investor protection is crucial to sound
corporate governance.2 15 Courts and legislatures aggressively reduced
private remedies over the last 20 years.216 These results are precisely in
accordance with the predictions of public choice and other theories of
legislation and lawmaking. 2 7 Moreover, there are quite often footprints of
management interests surrounding diluted shareholder protections and

2

°Himmelberg et al., supra note 207, at 38.
°The following analysis further clarifies this concept:
If the exogenous level of investor protection were perfect, insiders would
optimally choose to sell 100% of the equity (to diversify fully idiosyncratic risk)
and steal nothing, but with imperfect investor protection, this contract cannot be
(costlessly) enforced. By retaining a higher fraction of equity, insiders can
credibly commit to lower rates of stealing, but are forced to bear higher levels
of diversifiable risk.
2

Id. at 2.

21

in an assessment of fifty-one corporate governance elements, firm valuation positively
correlated to sound corporate governance, even after the SOX, although not as strongly as prior
to SOX. This is further empirical evidence that at least with respect to that particular index there
is still room for improvement in U.S. corporate governance. Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note
191, at 27. It is not my intent to construct a new index of investor protection, but rather simply
to highlight glaring deficiencies in the trajectory of corporate governance law versus the best
corporate science offered by economists and financial experts. Thus, the factors I focus upon are
driven by a subjective sense of specific elements that are most at odds with empirical learning
rather than on elements that seem most powerfully associated with firm value, firm financial
performance and macroeconomic performance.
212
See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
213
See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
214
See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
2
"See supra notes 80-91 and 141-63 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
217
Infra Part IV.
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compromised investor rights. 218 The science of corporate governance
shows that there is no market pressure for optimal corporate governance;
there is only market pressure for indulgent pro-management corporate
governance law. The next section seeks to articulate a means for
understanding the suboptimality of corporate governance for public
companies in the U.S.-the role of special interest influence.
IV. CEO PRIMACY AS A SPECIAL INTEREST OUTCOME
The idea that a "faction" of citizens can subvert government for their
own ends at the expense of the "aggregate interests" of society dates at least
to the founding of the nation.219 The solution to this problem animates the
antidemocratic structures embedded in the United States Constitution,
particularly as initially ratified. 22' The Founders specifically contemplated
some form of depoliticized lawmaking to protect against factions.22 The
result, which endures today, is a vision of democratic accountability rather
than democratic decision making.222 Thus, there is little new in considering
the pernicious potential of special interest influence, nor the proper
political structures for controlling such influence.
Indeed, decades ago, economist Mancur Olson laid a more refined
foundation for understanding how narrow and well-organized groups may
operate to subvert the commonweal through law and regulation in The
Logic of Collective Action.223 Olson recognized that collective action
218

Supra notes 12, 29, 41, & 76. Professor Cary noted that in 1963 Delware declared it
the policy of the state to enact pro-management corporation laws. Cary, supra note 15, at 663.
Other commentators have noted the control that the corporate bar exercises over corporate law in
Delaware. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of
Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469, 506-09 (1987).
21
'ITH FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1961).
22 0
See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522
(1990) ("If the Constitution's Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre
manner of demonstrating their affection.").
22
'For example, the President serves a four-year term, subject only to impeachment, and
Senators serve six-year terms. Article III judges enjoy lifetime tenure subject only to "good
behavior." U.S. CONST. art. 1M. American citizens thus elect leaders that are democratically
accountable for their decisions to various extents. Therefore, so long as political leaders remain
accountable for their decisions in supervising agencies, delegation to such agencies cannot be
termed antidemocratic, in any traditional sense. Ramirez, supra note 12, at 537.
222
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution,98 CoLUM. L. REv.
531, 565 (1998) ("Indications from the time surrounding the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution suggest that.., the view of accountability that the founding community held ... is
a view of accountability as a notion of blame.").
223

MANCUR OLSON, THELOGICOFCOLLECTIVE ACTION 2, 11, 165 (rev. ed. 1.971) (stating

that very large groups will not pursue organizations to influence public goods like law because
rational actors will instead assume that they can free ride on the efforts of others). Olson's
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problems encumbered large groups from pursuing their collective interests
and that as a consequence, taxpayers, consumers, those interested in peace,
and those in favor of sound economic policies are frequently foiled by
"special interests" with superior organizational capabilities and resources. 224 Large groups must contend with the fact that rational individuals will not devote time and resources to efforts that they cannot possibly
influence.225 Instead they will seek to free ride on the efforts of others.226
Olson further recognized that the apparent disproportionate representation
of business interests among any accounting of lobby groups was a direct
result of their concentrated economic power.22 7 Under Olson's analysis,

seminal work has transcended economics and taken root in both political science as well as law.
THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES
278-79 (2d ed. 1979) (impugning the regulatory state because centralized power facilitates
"personal plunder rather than public choice" and is more appropriately characterized as
"socialism for the organized, capitalism for the unorganized"); Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 343 (1974) (stating the economic
theory of regulation rejects the use of the term "capture" as "inappropriately militaristic," but
recognizes that private interests may subvert regulation).
224
Olsen made this point succinctly when he wrote:
The taxpayers are a vast group with an obvious common interest, but in an
important sense they have yet to obtain representation. The consumers are at
least as numerous as any other group in the society, but they have no
organization to countervail the power of organized monopolistic producers.
There are multitudes with an interest in peace, but they have no lobby to match
those of the "special interests" that may on occasion have an interest in war.
There are vast numbers who have a common interest in preventing inflation and
depression, but they have no organization to express that interest.
OLSON, supra note 223, at 165.
2251d. at 2, 48, & 53. "Group size is crucial for two reasons: (1) given the same total
benefit to the group, size is inversely related to the magnitude of any individual's stake; and (2)
size increases transaction costs." See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Public Choice
Revisited, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1715, 1718 (1998) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997)).
226
For example, Macey states:
By definition, the benefits from public spirited legislation fall on the public
generally. As such, it is extremely unlikely that any individual will find it
advantageous to devote privately the necessary resources to obtain such
legislation. Those members of the public who spend nothing will have a free
ride at the expense of those who invest in public-regarding legislation. Since
any gain goes to the group as a whole, those who contribute nothing benefit just
as much as those who have contributed a great deal. Thus it pays for each
individual to do nothing and to hope that others will make an effort upon which
he can "free ride."
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 231 n.44 (1986).
2 27
OLSON, supra note 223, at 141-48.
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concentrated economic power will prevail in the contest over law and
regulation.228
The idea that regulation and law are subject to special interest
influence exercised by well-organized groups with economic resources has
recently been extended to financial markets generally. 229 Financial markets
are a key engine of growth and innovation.2 30 The corporation is the central
economic institution underlying modern finance as limited liability permits
financial diversification, driving down the cost of capital and expanding the
pool of financial capital.2 3' Nevertheless, "[t]he economically powerful are
concerned about the institutions underpinning free markets because they
treat people equally, making power redundant.' '232 Moreover, "[t]hey are
a source of competition, forcing the powerful to prove their competence
again and again. ,2 33 Thus, the powerful will seek to entrench their control
and position, rather than expose themselves to a truly competitive
environment.2 34 They will do this, if necessary, through well-organized
groups that sacrifice competitive markets for legal indulgences.235 This is
why today there is broad support across the political spectrum 236 for the
proposition that left unchecked, capitalism "easily degenerates into a
system of incumbents, by incumbents and for incumbents. ,237
There are few incumbents more powerful than the incumbent CEOs
of public corporations. CEOs have been able to double their share of
corporate profits just in the past few years.238 Soaring executive
compensation has substantially contributed to rising economic inequality

228/d
229

'

RAGHURAm G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPrTALIsTs

164-71 (2004) ("Small well-focused groups can sway government policies toward their interests
at the expense of the public. Since financial markets rely on the government for good policies,
these polices may never be enacted when well-organized incumbents oppose them.") (citing
OLSON, supra note 223; George Stigler, Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971)).
23.RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 229, at 1 ("[F]inancial markets keep alive the process
of'creative destruction'-whereby old ideas and organizations are constantly challenged by new,
better ones.").
23 1
1d. at 45-47 (stating that limited liability corporations are "one of the more ingenious
economic institutions created by mankind").
232
1d. at 9.
2331Id.
234

RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 229, at 9.

23 5

Supra note 223.

236

RAiAN & ZINGALES, supra note 229, at xi-xii.

237

1d. at 312.
Supra note 117.

2 38
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in the United States.2 39 CEOs enjoy almost unfettered discretion over the
composition of the central governing organ of American corporations-the
board of directors. 2" Short of intentional wrongdoing, neither CEOs nor
their nominal supervisors-directors-face any real risk of legal liability,
specifically as a result of relatively recent legislative victories.2 4 1 CEOs of
public companies are the primary stewards of vast stores of wealth, as the
combined market capitalization of the approximately 5000 public
companies in the U.S. exceeds $16 trillion.242
As Olson would have predicted, with tremendous economic
resources and relatively small numbers, CEOs face few constraints in
organizing politically. One organization, the Business Roundtable, consists
largely of CEOs of major public corporations.243 It litigates and lobbies
with the specific intent of minimizing constraints on the power of CEOs.24
Another organization, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, represents big
business generally, and also operates to free CEOs of legal constraints. 245
Each of these organizations has a long and successful history of achieving
pro-CEO outcomes in law and regulation. Other trade associations, such
as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, also pursue
vigorous lobbying efforts that invariably coincide with the interests of their
corporate masters, which are operated under the authority of the CEO.246
In addition, each individual corporation frequently has its own legions of
lobbyists that are controlled by CEOs.24 7 CEOs also have the ear of elected
politicians through their control of campaign contributions, including
control over the corporation's own political action committee.24 8
Against this array of CEO power, shareholders hold little sway, also
in accordance with the predictions of Olson's theory. Shareholders, unlike

23 9

The income garnered by the top decile in the United States increased over last twentyfive years to 40-45% of overall U.S. income. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution
of Top Incomes: A Historicaland InternationalPerspective, 96 AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS
200, 201 (2006), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/piketty-saezAEAPP06.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2006). This increase is attributable to "the very large increases in top wages

(especially top executive compensation)." Id. at 204.
2

"Supra notes 94-98.
74.
Supra note 8.
243
Former SEC chair Arthur Levitt describes the Business Roundtable as "an association
of chairmen and CEOs of large corporations." LEVifT, supra note 11, at 96.
2
"See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(invalidating SEC rule that required listed companies to adhere to one vote per share voting).
245
See LEVITr, supra note 11, at 237.
24
Supra note
24 2

2
"See
247

id. at 114-15.
1Id. at 238.

24 8

id.
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CEOs, have no authority to disburse corporate funds to influence law and
regulation. 2 9 The large number of shareholders means that any lobby
group formed to pursue their interests generally would face serious
Consequently, there is no organization that
collective action problems.
lobbies in favor of public shareholders. 25 "They are the most overlooked
and underrepresented interest group in America.' '252 Thus, any political
contest between shareholders and managers is a mismatch to say the least.
It would be pleasant to believe that somehow financial markets could
remedy this mismatch. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to support
such faith in markets. 253 The first problem with such faith is that all
markets suffer from imperfect information, and financial markets are no

exception.254 On the contrary, financial markets could not exist if there was

perfect information.
One manifest imperfection is that capital markets
fail to impound information regarding corporate governance issues.256 For
example, there is little credible evidence that incorporation in Delaware
adds financial value. 257 As previously shown, corporate governance is
manifestly suboptimal in the United States, and seems to permit excessive
agency costs.

58

The empirical analysis of Part III of this article shows

there is no market force in favor of optimal-or even acceptablecorporate governance standards.25 9 While corporate governance can be
material in certain transient contexts,260 the markets often seem impervious
to its financial consequences. 26' In short, there is little reason to think that
the current political structure governing corporate governance generally is

249

For example, Walter Hewlett expended $150 million in a contest with Hewlett-Packard,
and lost. Supra notes 95-96.
25 0
As Arthur Levitt states, in the lobbying hierarchy "[s]hareholders, and especially
individual investors come last. There is no one, in fact, who represents individual investors fulltime." LEvrr, supra note 11, at 237.
251
Id. Institutional shareholders face problems similar to accountants in pursuing the
interests of shareholders generally; specifically, many institutional shareholders depend upon
corporations, and management in particular, for patronage.
252
1d"
253
See supra notes 34, 55-58 and accompanying text.
25 4

RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 229, at 28-29, 56.

255

See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility ofInformationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
256
See supra notes 34, 55-64.
257
See supra note 34.
258
5ee supra Part III.
259
1d.
2

'In the wake of the scandals of 2001 to 2002, investors focused more on corporate
governance considerations, but apparently not the state of incorporation. See supranotes 58, 191.
261

See supra notes 55-64.
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likely to ever be efficacious at impounding the best empirical learning
regarding corporate governance.262 In the backwater of the markets'
neglect, special interests will hold sway over both state corporate
governance law and federal corporate governance law.
Special interest influence can often be difficult to trace.263 On the
other hand it is often quite manifest, in the use of money and influence, and
the outcomes that seem otherwise inexplicable, but operate to benefit those
with power and influence. For example, Congress has used federal power
to eviscerate securities litigation based upon "anecdotal evidence and
unproven theories." 26' The PSLRA was driven more by "money and
influence peddling" than by any evidence of securities litigation abuses.265
Similarly, Delaware has long been influenced by corporate management
and the corporate bar more than the influence of sound policy. 266 Thus, the
evisceration of the duty of care is associated not only with interests of
management, but with interests of the insurance industry as well, even
though the insurance industry was the only actor that left its fingerprints on
the Delaware legislation.267 Sometimes the exercise of special interest
influence is notorious, as the efforts of management to maintain their
domination of the proxy machinery were.268 Other times, eyewitnesses
attest to the exercise of special interest influence, as former SEC senior
managers have done. 69 In sum, while the outlines of special interest power
may be clear, inferences must sometimes be used to explain otherwise
highly indulgent outcomes that in context seem best explained by special
interest influence.27 °
This means that any proposed improvements to corporate governance
in America that do not reckon with the reality of special interest influence
are unlikely to lead to durable reform. For example, those arguing that the
status quo is acceptable, or that it should be extended to some sort of
competitive federalism for securities regulation, fail to acknowledge how

262

See supra Part IH.

26 3

See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New
Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1233 (2006) (stating that special interest
negotiation taking place between lawmakers and organized groups with wealth can be "wellhidden").
264
Ramirez, supra note 27, at 1086.
26 5

1d. at 1087.

2

"See supra note 218.
See supra note 76.
268
See supra notes 28, 98.
267

269

See supra notes 11, 29.

27 0

See supra note 111.
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collective action distorts markets for law and regulation.2 7' Those arguing
in favor of an expanded role for the federal government fail to acknowledge
that federal law can fall prey to special interest influence as much as state
law.272 By ignoring special interest influence, both approaches, although
seemingly at polar opposites, essentially leave the basic collective action
and public choice dynamics in place. 273 Both, therefore, to the same extent,
are bound to leave corporate governance subject to a continued cycle of
chaotic evolution untethered to policy and vulnerable to special interest
raids. 274 This is not optimal.
On this latter point, there is broad agreement: both sides to the race
to the bottom debate claim that, as currently structured, corporate
governance yields suboptimal results. 275 This is also in accord with the
empirical evidence to date. This suboptimality is not likely to improve.
Many voices in fact concur that creeping federalization in response to
repeated corporate governance crises is likely. 276 The federal response has
been a mixed bag at best. 277 There is little reason to think state law
evolution will be superior. Indeed, at both levels one constant seems true:
27 8
CEOs seemingly always accrue more power subject to fewer constraints.
In fact, the pattern is likely to reinforce itself: economists predict that
growing inequality would naturally lead to legal system outcomes that

271
2

See supra note 38.

27 E.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 42, at 1798. Bebchuck and Hamdani do not

address the role of the PSLRA in precipitating the corporate corruption crisis of 2001 and 2002,
as well as other documented instances of federal law falling prey to special interest influence. See
supranotes 11, 28, 29,41, 44, & 111. I argue that as presently constituted, federal law is central
to the creation of CEO primacy, notwithstanding the historic pattern of federal intervention
articulated by Bebchuk and Hamdani.
273For example, Bebchuk and Hamdani advocate the creation of a federal commission to
study corporate governance and make recommendations to Congress. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 42, at 1798. I am skeptical of any recommendation to throw corporate governance issues to
Congress without adequate safeguards regarding special interest influence.
274
The sporadic interference of Congress into state corporate governance law would be
forecast by theories of legal reform, particularly given the ability of corporate governance to
influence macroeconomic growth and stability. See Dani Rodrik, UnderstandingEconomic
Policy Reform, 34 J. ECON. Lrr. 9, 31-38 (1996) (articulating a theory of economic reform which
views economic crises as a central factor).
27 5
Compare Romano, supra note 20, at 1602 (stating that SOX is "seriously
misconceived"), with Fairfax, supra note 21, at 456 (finding director liability regime "defective").
276
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalizationof CorporateLaw, REG. 26,
28 (Spring 2003) (stating that corporate scandals are a "bullish signal" for further federal
intervention).
2 7
7 See generally supra notes 81-117 (discussing the ineffective impact of the SOX
reforms).
27
See supra notes 118-24.
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favor the rich and powerful.279 Until the system is depoliticized to some
extent, suboptimal results will continue and perhaps even deepen.
In a related work, I have proposed an optimal depoliticized
regulatory structure for public companies that would be charged with
articulating corporate governance standards based upon the best empirical
data available.28 ° Shareholders directly would be empowered to select the
federal corporate governance regime.281 This would create immediate competitive pressure to adhere to the best learning regarding corporate
governance for all jurisdictions.282 The market would react to the pronouncements of an agency with recognized expertise and a depoliticized
regulatory structure on par with the Federal Reserve Board. 283 This
approach would directly seek to impound the best empirical data available
into the nation's corporate governance regime.
Earlier, I proposed that senior officers and directors of public
companies be subject to a federal professional regulation regime, subject
to the supervision of a regulatory agency.284 There is reason to believe that
such a regime could well operate to depoliticize governance standards, as
it has to an extent so operated in the securities industry, or with respect to
accountants and attorneys .285 In each instance, professional self-regulation
28 6
has produced a stable regulatory outcome, without any major crisis.
Professional self-regulation of senior officers and directors (under the
supervision of an administrative agency) may thus hold the promise of
depoliticizing corporate governance.
The same cannot be said of the current corporate governance regime.
Academic voices are increasingly recognizing that the current system is not
stable in the sense that it yields standards that are not tethered to sound
policy, and that the crux of the problem is politics. 287 So long as political
considerations dominate the motives of both federal and state policymakers,

9
.. Edward Glaeser et al., The Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MON. ECON. 199, 199-200

(2003).

2 80

Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate GovernanceLaw: Optimizing Regulatory
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://lIaw.

809.
bepress.com/expresso/eps/1
281
Id. at 3.
282

id.

283

Id. at 3-5.

2

8Ramirez, supra note 92, at 1005-08.

285

id.

2116d. at 1008.
287
Id. at 1006-08.
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corporate governance will not be based upon the best empirical learning. 2 11
Ultimately, there will be constant economic pressure for reform.28 9 To this
extent, the current regime is inherently non-sustainable. 290 Foreign regimes
will adopt superior regimes yielding superior economic outcomes and/or
the U.S. will be plagued by serial financial crises until durable reform takes
hold.29'
IV. CONCLUSION

Corporate governance in the United States suffers from a flawed
legal structure that yields suboptimal results. The SEC is subject to the
distortions implicit in a politicized regulatory agency. State legislatures
show little concern over achieving optimal corporate governance standards.
Courts seem to guess at the best corporate governance outcomes rather than
rely upon the best financial and economic science available. In short, the
reason why corporate governance in the U.S. diverges from the optimal
corporate governance emerging from economic and financial science is
because there is no mechanism at present to assure that optimal corporate
governance standards prevail.
28
See generally supranotes 99-106, 192-2 10 (discussing the different legislative policy
regarding corporate governance).
289
As previously demonstrated, the economic costs of a suboptimal corporate governance

regime are significant. See generally supra notes 207-11 (discussing how improvements in
corporate governance would be economically different).
'China has already demonstrated an ability to achieve remarkable growth by finding
alternatives to the American system. JOSEPH STIGLrTZ, GLOBAIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
180-86 (2002) (finding that China's economy is "directly opposite to the market fundamentalism
prescribed by the U.S.").
29
Between the summer of 2002, with its parade of corporate scandals, and the summer
of 2006, with revelations of a widening options scandal that former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt
called the "ultimate in greed," was the Refco public offering fraud of the fall of 2005. See Forelle
& Bandler, supra note 121, at Al; Ramirez, supra note 5, at 359. Refco was the largest
independent futures broker in the U.S. Its CEO concealed $430 million in debts that he owed
Refco through entities he controlled, leading to his indictment for securities fraud. The Refco
public offering would have triggered the full applicability of the SOX, but only after the company
consummated its public offering. The SEC had regulatory authority over the Refco public
offering and its securities brokerage units. Grant Thornton audited the firm's books in accordance
with the new SOX regime governing audits of public firms. Numerous underwriters and
professionals (including the attorneys) would each have been subject to the "due diligence"
requirements of federal securities laws. Still, despite all of this oversight, millions in debts owed
by the firm's CEO were not discovered until after the public offering. One expert concluded that
"[t]here is no way you can rely on an auditor or an investment bank for a seal of approval or a
guarantee of no chicanery .... The lesson to be learned from Refco is that you must do sleuth
work yourself." Id.
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There is little evidence that any market for corporate governance is
operating to move standards toward optimal outcomes. Investors seem not
to impound material corporate governance law into their investment
decisions. Our history of corporate federalism is packed with instances of
special interest influence holding decisive power, and not any concept of
optimality. More importantly, it is now clear that capital markets are
yielding unsatisfactory outcomes in terms of corporate governance. Indeed,
permitting unbridled CEO power to reign in corporate America, as it does
today, is inconsistent with any principled economic view of how corporate
governance should function.
Instead, it appears the only market functioning to define corporate
governance is the market predicted by public choice enthusiasts with
respect to regulation and legislative action generally. CEOs have superior
resources and organizational capabilities. They have incentives to undertake collective action designed to assure that their interests prevail over the
general public interest. Lawmakers are beholden to the views of the
powerful and the organized, and there is neither an effective investors
lobby nor any general economic growth lobby. Outcomes are decisively in
favor of CEO power, with little legal constraint. At both the federal and
state level, corporate governance outcomes seem best explained by special
interest influence.
Thus, solutions to the patent suboptimality of corporate governance
in the U.S. must account for the need to create legal structures that can
resist the power of special interest influence. The emerging science of
corporate governance lights the way for formulating more powerful
corporate governance standards. It is up to lawyers to articulate legal and
political structures that can make that vision a reality. Either crises or
international competition is likely to create pressure for more optimal
corporate governance mechanisms. The long-standing system of corporate
federalism in the U.S. seems rigged for self-destruction.
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